means always incurred.  But in order that the weaker may be saved from them, it behooves the stronger to abstain.  All betting, all playing games for money, all gambling in stocks is wrong in principle, liable to bring needless unhappiness.  The honorable man will hate to take money which has not been fairly earned; he will wish to help protect those who are prone to run useless risks against themselves.  The safest place to draw the line is on the near side of all gambling, however trivial.[Footnote:  See H. Jeffs, Concerning Conscience, Appendix.  R. E. Speer, A Young Man’s Questions, chap. xi B. S. Rowntree, Betting and Gambling.  International Journal of Ethics, vol. 18, p. 76.] General relations to others:  F. Paulsen, System of Ethics, book iii, chap.  IX, sec. 6; chap.  X, secs. 3, 4, 5.  G. Santayana, Reason in Society.  J. S. Mackenzie, Manual of Ethics, 2d ed, chap.  IX.  Emerson, Society and Solitude title essay.  P. G. Hamerton, The Intellectual Life, part ix.  Friendship:  Aristotle, Ethics, books.  VIII, ix.  Emerson, “Friendship” (in Essays, vol.  I).  H. C. Trumbull, Friendship the Master Passion.  Randolph Bourne, in Atlantic Monthly, vol. 110, p. 795.  Luxury:  E. de Laveleye, Luxury.  E. J. Urwick, Luxury and Waste of Life.  Tolstoy, What Shall We Do Then? (or, What To Do?) Maeterlinck, “Our Social Duty” (in Measure of the Hours).  F. Paulsen, System of Ethics, book iii, chap.  IV, secs. 3, 4.  T. W. Higginson, in Atlantic Monthly, vol. 107, p. 301.  H. Sidgwick, Practical Ethics, chap.  VII.  Hibbert Journal, vol.  II, p. 39.  H. R. Seager, Introduction to Economics, chap.  IV, secs. 43-45.

CHAPTER XIX

TRUTHFULNESS AND ITS PROBLEMS

Sins of untruthfulness are not so seductive or, usually, so serious as those we have been considering; but for that reason they are perhaps more pervasive — we are less on our guard against them.  What are the reasons for the obligation of truthfulness?  Truthfulness means trustworthiness.  The organization of society could not be maintained without mutual confidence.  This general need and the specific harm done to the individual lied to, if he is thereby misled, are sufficiently plain. [Footnote:  I will content myself with quoting one sentence from Mill (Utilitarianism, chap.  II), warning the reader to take a deep breath before he plunges in:  “Inasmuch as the cultivation in ourselves of a sensitive feeling on the subject of veracity is one of the most useful, and the enfeeblement of that feeling one of the most hurtful, things to which our conduct can be instrumental; and inasmuch as any, even unintentional, deviation from truth does that much towards weakening the trustworthiness of human assertion, which is not only the principal support of all present social well-being, but the insufficiency of which does more than any one [other] thing that can be named to keep back civilization,