(3) The third method of moral development is that which we call “learning by experience.”  The pain or dissatisfaction which a wrong impulse brings in its train, the satisfaction which follows a moral act, are remembered, and recur with the recurrence of a similar situation, becoming perhaps the decisive factors in steering the animal or man toward his true welfare.  Many animals quite low in the organic scale learn by experience; and though of course the degree of consciousness that accompanies these readjustments varies enormously, this method of moralization may be said to be always, like the preceding, a more or less conscious process.  Learning by experience is subject, of course, to many mistaken judgments; the fallacy of post hoc propter hoc leads many learners to avoid perfectly innocent acts as supposedly involving some evil result with which they were once by chance connected; and the true causes of the evils are often overlooked.  Even when dimly conscious readjustments become highly conscious deliberation, the results of that deliberation may be less forwarding morally than the unconscious and merciless grinding of natural selection.

More and more, of course, as men grew in power of reflection, did they consciously shape their morals; and this intelligent selection, which has as yet played a comparatively small role, is bound, as men become more and more rational, to supersede in importance the other factors in moral evolution.  But in the later phases of evolution all three of these processes blend together; and it would be impossible for the keenest analyst to tell how much of his conduct was determined in each of these ways.

H. Spencer, Data of Ethics (also published as the first part of his Principles of Ethics), chap.  I and chap.  II, through sec. 4; or J. Fiske, Cosmic Philosophy, part ii, chap, XXII, first half, to “We are now prepared to deal.”  L. T. Hobhouse, Morals in Evolution, part I, chap.  I, secs. 1-4.  I. King, Development of Religion, pp. 48-59 A great mass of concrete material will be found in E. Westermarck’s Origin and Development of Moral Ideas, H. O. Taylor’s Ancient Ideals, W. E. H. Leeky’s History of European Morals.

CHAPTER II

THE ORIGIN OF SOCIAL MORALITY

How early was social morality developed?

By social morality we mean, concretely, such virtues as tender and fostering love, sympathy, obedience, subordination of selfish instincts to group-demands, the service of other individuals or of the group.  These habits are later in development than some of the personal virtues, but long antedate the differentiation of man from the other animals.  Instances of self-sacrificing devotion of parent to offspring among birds and beasts are too common to need mention.  Devotion to the mate, though less developed, is early present in many species.  The strict subordination of ants and bees to the common welfare is a well-known marvel,