(2) We must remember that the types of conduct which we have glorified by the concepts “virtue,” “duty,” etc, are those which tend to produce happiness.  We have to frame our judgments and pigeonhole acts according to their normal results.  But it happens not infrequently that accidents upset these natural tendencies.  For these unforeseeable eventualities the actor is not responsible; if his act was the best that could have been planned, in consideration of all known factors, it remains the ideal for future cases, it still retains the halo of “virtue” which must attract others to it.  Good acts may lead, by unexpected chance, to evil consequences; bad acts may result, by some accident, in good.  But to the interfering factor belongs the credit or blame; the act that would normally have led to good or to evil remains right or wrong.  To rescue a drowning man is right, for such action normally tends to human welfare; if the rescued man turns out a great criminal, or escapes this death to suffer a worse, the act of rescuing the drowning remains a desirable and therefore moral act.  On the other hand, if one man slanders another, with the result that the latter, refuting the slander, thereby attains prominence and position, the act of slander, normally harmful, remains an immoral act.

It is a failure to recognize this necessarily general character of our moral judgments that raises the problem of Job.  The ancient Israelites saw clearly that righteousness was the road to happiness; [Footnote:  Cf. for example, “Righteousness tendeth to life; he that pursueth evil pursueth it to his own death.”  “Blessed is every one that feareth the Lord, that walketh in his ways.  Happy shalt thou be, and it shall be well with thee.”] and when a righteous man like Job fell into misfortune, they accused him of secret sin.  Job is conscious of his innocence, of having done his part aright, and cannot understand how he has come to such an evil pass.  It would have brought him no material alleviation, but it might have saved him some mental chafing, to recognize that morality is simply doing our part.  When we have done our best we are still at the mercy of fortune.  Happiness, as Aristotle pointed out, is the result of two cooperating factors, morality and good fortune. [Footnote:  Nichomachean Ethics, book I, several places:  e.g, in chap.  VII, “To constitute happiness there must be, as we have said, complete virtue and fit external conditions.”] If either is lacking, evil will ensue.  If all men were perfectly virtuous, we should still be at the mercy of flood and lightning, poisonous snakes, icebergs and fog at sea, a thousand forms of accident and disease, old age and death.  The millennium will not bring pure happiness to man; he is too feeble a creature in the presence of forces with which he cannot cope.  Morality is just-the best man can do; and it is not to be blamed for the twists of fate that make futile its efforts. (3) Are there not, however,