Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 77 pages of information about Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 77 pages of information about Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.

3.12 I call the sign with which we express a thought a propositional sign.And a proposition is a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world.

3.13 A proposition, therefore, does not actually contain its sense, but does contain the possibility of expressing it. (’The content of a proposition’ means the content of a proposition that has sense.) A proposition contains the form, but not the content, of its sense.

3.14 What constitutes a propositional sign is that in its elements (the words) stand in a determinate relation to one another.  A propositional sign is a fact.

3.141 A proposition is not a blend of words.(Just as a theme in music is not a blend of notes.) A proposition is articulate.

3.142 Only facts can express a sense, a set of names cannot.

3.143 Although a propositional sign is a fact, this is obscured by the usual form of expression in writing or print.  For in a printed proposition, for example, no essential difference is apparent between a propositional sign and a word. (That is what made it possible for Frege to call a proposition a composite name.)

3.1431 The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written signs.

3.1432 Instead of, ’The complex sign “aRb” says that a stands to b in the relation R’ we ought to put, ’That “a” stands to “b” in a certain relation says that aRb.’

3.144 Situations can be described but not given names.

3.2 In a proposition a thought can be expressed in such a way that elements of the propositional sign correspond to the objects of the thought.

3.201 I call such elements ‘simple signs’, and such a proposition ’complete analysed’.

3.202 The simple signs employed in propositions are called names.

3.203 A name means an object.  The object is its meaning. (’A’ is the same sign as ’A’.)

3.21 The configuration of objects in a situation corresponds to the configuration of simple signs in the propositional sign.

3.221 Objects can only be named.  Signs are their representatives.  I can only speak about them:  I cannot put them into words.  Propositions can only say how things are, not what they are.

3.23 The requirement that simple signs be possible is the requirement that sense be determinate.

3.24 A proposition about a complex stands in an internal relation to a proposition about a constituent of the complex.  A complex can be given only by its description, which will be right or wrong.  A proposition that mentions a complex will not be nonsensical, if the complex does not exits, but simply false.  When a propositional element signifies a complex, this can be seen from an indeterminateness in the propositions in which it occurs.  In such cases we know that the proposition leaves something undetermined. (In fact the notation for generality contains a prototype.) The contraction of a symbol for a complex into a simple symbol can be expressed in a definition.

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Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.