6.3751 For example, the simultaneous presence of two colours at the same place in the visual field is impossible, in fact logically impossible, since it is ruled out by the logical structure of colour.  Let us think how this contradiction appears in physics:  more or less as follows—­a particle cannot have two velocities at the same time; that is to say, it cannot be in two places at the same time; that is to say, particles that are in different places at the same time cannot be identical. (It is clear that the logical product of two elementary propositions can neither be a tautology nor a contradiction.  The statement that a point in the visual field has two different colours at the same time is a contradiction.)

6.4 All propositions are of equal value.

6.41 The sense of the world must lie outside the world.  In the world everything is as it is, and everything happens as it does happen:  in it no value exists—­and if it did exist, it would have no value.  If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case.  For all that happens and is the case is accidental.  What makes it non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it would itself be accidental.  It must lie outside the world.

6.42 So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics.  Propositions can express nothing that is higher.

6.421 It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words.  Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)

6.422 When an ethical law of the form, ‘Thou shalt ...’ is laid down, one’s first thought is, ‘And what if I do, not do it?’ It is clear, however, that ethics has nothing to do with punishment and reward in the usual sense of the terms.  So our question about the consequences of an action must be unimportant.—­At least those consequences should not be events.  For there must be something right about the question we posed.  There must indeed be some kind of ethical reward and ethical punishment, but they must reside in the action itself. (And it is also clear that the reward must be something pleasant and the punishment something unpleasant.)

6.423 It is impossible to speak about the will in so far as it is the subject of ethical attributes.  And the will as a phenomenon is of interest only to psychology.

6.43 If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the facts—­not what can be expressed by means of language.  In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world.  It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole.  The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy man.

6.431 So too at death the world does not alter, but comes to an end.

6.4311 Death is not an event in life:  we do not live to experience death.  If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs to those who live in the present.  Our life has no end in just the way in which our visual field has no limits.