5.555 Clearly we have some concept of elementary propositions quite apart from their particular logical forms.  But when there is a system by which we can create symbols, the system is what is important for logic and not the individual symbols.  And anyway, is it really possible that in logic I should have to deal with forms that I can invent?  What I have to deal with must be that which makes it possible for me to invent them.

5.556 There cannot be a hierarchy of the forms of elementary propositions.  We can foresee only what we ourselves construct.

5.5561 Empirical reality is limited by the totality of objects.  The limit also makes itself manifest in the totality of elementary propositions.  Hierarchies are and must be independent of reality.

5.5562 If we know on purely logical grounds that there must be elementary propositions, then everyone who understands propositions in their C form must know It.

5.5563 In fact, all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order.—­That utterly simple thing, which we have to formulate here, is not a likeness of the truth, but the truth itself in its entirety. (Our problems are not abstract, but perhaps the most concrete that there are.)

5.557 The application of logic decides what elementary propositions there are.  What belongs to its application, logic cannot anticipate.  It is clear that logic must not clash with its application.  But logic has to be in contact with its application.  Therefore logic and its application must not overlap.

5.5571 If I cannot say a priori what elementary propositions there are, then the attempt to do so must lead to obvious nonsense. 5.6 The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.

5.61 Logic pervades the world:  the limits of the world are also its limits.  So we cannot say in logic, ’The world has this in it, and this, but not that.’  For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case, since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way could it view those limits from the other side as well.  We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either.

5.62 This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in solipsism.  For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said , but makes itself manifest.  The world is my world:  this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world.

5.621 The world and life are one.

5.63 I am my world. (The microcosm.)

5.631 There is no such thing as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas.  If I wrote a book called The World as l found it , I should have to include a report on my body, and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my will, and which were not, etc., this being a method of isolating the subject, or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject; for it alone could not be mentioned in that book.—­