to each music hall would have meant an appreciable addition to the ratepayers’ burden.  In the face of such difficulties the proposal melted away.  Had it been pushed through, and the inspectors appointed, each of them would have become a censor, and the whole body of inspectors would have become a police des moeurs.  Those who know the history of such police forces on the continent will understand how impossible it would be to procure inspectors whose characters would stand the strain of their opportunities of corruption, both pecuniary and personal, at such salaries as a local authority could be persuaded to offer.

It has been suggested that the present censorship should be supplemented by a board of experts, who should deal, not with the whole mass of plays sent up for license, but only those which the Examiner of Plays refuses to pass.  As the number of plays which the Examiner refuses to pass is never great enough to occupy a Board in permanent session with regular salaries, and as casual employment is not compatible with public responsibility, this proposal would work out in practice as an addition to the duties of some existing functionary.  A Secretary of State would be objectionable as likely to be biased politically.  An ecclesiastical referee might be biassed against the theatre altogether.  A judge in chambers would be the proper authority.  This plan would combine the inevitable intolerance of an enlightened censorship with the popular laxity of the Lord Chamberlain.

The judge would suppress the pioneers, whilst the Examiner of Plays issued two guinea certificates for the vulgar and vicious plays.  For this reason the plan would no doubt be popular; but it would be very much as a relaxation of the administration of the Public Health Acts accompanied by the cheapening of gin would be popular.

THE ARBITRATION PROPOSAL

On the occasion of a recent deputation of playwrights to the Prime Minister it was suggested that if a censorship be inevitable, provision should be made for an appeal from the Lord Chamberlain in cases of refusal of licence.  The authors of this suggestion propose that the Lord Chamberlain shall choose one umpire and the author another.  The two umpires shall then elect a referee, whose decision shall be final.

This proposal is not likely to be entertained by constitutional lawyers.  It is a naive offer to accept the method of arbitration in what is essentially a matter, not between one private individual or body and another, but between a public offender and the State.  It will presumably be ruled out as a proposal to refer a case of manslaughter to arbitration would be ruled out.  But even if it were constitutionally sound, it bears all the marks of that practical inexperience which leads men to believe that arbitration either costs nothing or is at least cheaper than law.  Who is to pay for the time of the three arbitrators, presumably men of high professional standing?  The author may not be able:  the manager may not be willing:  neither of them should be called upon to pay for a public service otherwise than by their contributions to the revenue.  Clearly the State should pay.  But even so, the difficulties are only beginning.  A licence is seldom refused except on grounds which are controversial.