THE OBJECTION OF COURT ETIQUET

There is another objection to the Lord Chamberlain’s censorship which affects the author’s choice of subject.  Formerly very little heed was given in England to the susceptibilities of foreign courts.  For instance, the notion that the Mikado of Japan should be as sacred to the English playwright as he is to the Japanese Lord Chamberlain would have seemed grotesque a generation ago.  Now that the maintenance of entente cordiale between nations is one of the most prominent and most useful functions of the crown, the freedom of authors to deal with political subjects, even historically, is seriously threatened by the way in which the censorship makes the King responsible for the contents of every play.  One author—­the writer of these lines, in fact—­has long desired to dramatize the life of Mahomet.  But the possibility of a protest from the Turkish Ambassador—­or the fear of it—­causing the Lord Chamberlain to refuse to license such a play has prevented the play from being written.  Now, if the censorship were abolished, nobody but the author could be held responsible for the play.  The Turkish Ambassador does not now protest against the publication of Carlyle’s essay on the prophet, or of the English translations of the Koran in the prefaces to which Mahomet is criticized as an impostor, or of the older books in which he is reviled as Mahound and classed with the devil himself.  But if these publications had to be licensed by the Lord Chamberlain it would be impossible for the King to allow the licence to be issued, as he would thereby be made responsible for the opinions expressed.  This restriction of the historical drama is an unmixed evil.  Great religious leaders are more interesting and more important subjects for the dramatist than great conquerors.  It is a misfortune that public opinion would not tolerate a dramatization of Mahomet in Constantinople.  But to prohibit it here, where public opinion would tolerate it, is an absurdity which, if applied in all directions, would make it impossible for the Queen to receive a Turkish ambassador without veiling herself, or the Dean and Chapter of St. Paul’s to display a cross on the summit of their Cathedral in a city occupied largely and influentially by Jews.  Court etiquet is no doubt an excellent thing for court ceremonies; but to attempt to impose it on the drama is about as sensible as an attempt to make everybody in London wear court dress.

WHY NOT AN ENLIGHTENED CENSORSHIP?

In the above cases the general question of censorship is separable from the question of the present form of it.  Every one who condemns the principle of censorship must also condemn the Lord Chamberlain’s control of the drama; but those who approve of the principle do not necessarily approve of the Lord Chamberlain being the Censor ex officio.  They may, however, be entirely opposed to popular liberties, and may conclude from what has been said, not that the stage should be made as free as the church, press, or platform, but that these institutions should be censored as strictly as the stage.  It will seem obvious to them that nothing is needed to remove all objections to a censorship except the placing of its powers in better hands.