Much in Bergson would point to the need for the addition of a philosophy of Values.  This, however, he does not give us.  He shirks the deeper problems of the moral and spiritual life of man.  He undervalues, indeed ignores, the influence of transcendent ideas or ideals on the life-history of mankind.  The study of these might have led him to admit a teleology of some kind; for “in the thinking consciousness the order of growth is largely determined by choice; and choice is guided by valuation.  We are, in general, only partially aware of the ends that we pursue.  But we are more and more seeking to attain what is good, true and beautiful, and the order of human life becomes more and more guided by the consciousness of these ends.” [Footnote:  Professor Mackenzie:  Elements of Constructive Philosophy, p. 111.] Bergson, however, will not ultimately be able to evade the work of attempting some reconciliation of moral ideas and ideals with their crude and animal origins and environment, to which they are so opposed and to which they are actually offering a very strong opposition.  That he himself has seen this is proved by the attention he is now giving to the problems of social Ethics.

There are four problems which confront every evolutionary theory.  These concern the origin of:  Matter, Life, Consciousness, and Conscience.  Bergson finds it very difficult to account for the origin of Matter, and it is not clear from what he says why the original consciousness should have made Matter and then be obliged to fight against it in order to be free.  Then, in speaking of the law of Thermodynamics, he says:  “Any material system which should store energy by arresting its degradation to some lower level, and produce effects by its sudden liberation, would exhibit something in the nature of Life.”  This, however, is not very precise, for this would hold true of thunder-clouds and of many machines.  In regard to Instinct, it has been pointed out by several experts that Instinct is not so infallible as Bergson makes out.  Of the mistakes of Instinct he says little.  Dr. McDougall in his great work Body and Mind says, when speaking of Bergson’s doctrine of Evolution:  “Its recognition of the continuity of all Life is the great merit of Professor Bergson’s theory of Creative Evolution; its failure to give any intelligible account of individuality is its greatest defect.  I venture to think,” he continues, “that the most urgent problem confronting the philosophic biologist is the construction of a theory of life which will harmonize the facts of individuality with the appearance of the continuity of all life, with the theory of progressive evolution, and with the facts of heredity and biparental reproduction.” [Footnote:  McDougall, Body and Mind, Footnote to p. 377.]