Intuition is in no way mysterious, Bergson claims.  Every one of us has had opportunities to exercise it in some degree, and anyone, for example, who has been engaged in literary work, knows perfectly well that after long study has been given to the subject, when all documents have been collected and necessary drafts worked out, one thing more is needful—­an effort, a travail of soul, a setting of oneself in the heart of the subject; in short, the getting of inspiration.  Metaphysical Intuition seems to be of this nature, and its relation to the empirical data contributed by the Intellect is parallel to the relation between the literary man’s inspiration and his collected material.  Of course “it is impossible to have an Intuition of reality, that is, an intellectual sympathy, with its innermost nature, unless its confidence has been won by a long comradeship with its external manifestation.”  In his study of Lucretius [Footnote:  Extraits de Lucrece avec etude sur la poesie, la philosophie, la physique le texte et la langue de Lucrece (1884).  Preface, p. xx.] he remarks that the chief value of the Latin poet-philosopher lay in his power of vision, in his insight into the beauty of nature, in his synthetic view, while at the same time he was able to exercise his keenly analytic intellect in discovering all he could about the facts of nature in their scientific aspect.  At the same time, metaphysical Intuition, although only to be obtained through acquaintance with empirical data, is quite other than the mere summary of such knowledge. [Footnote:  See protest:  L’Intuition philosophique in Revue de metaphysique et de morale, 1911, p. 821.] It is distinct from these data, as the motor impulse is distinct from the path traversed by the moving body, as the tension of the spring is distinct from the visible movements of the pendulum.  In this sense Metaphysics has nothing in common with a generalization of facts.  It might, however, be defined as “integral experience.”  Nevertheless Intuition, once attained, must find a mode of expression in well-defined concepts, for in itself it is incommunicable.  Dialectic is necessary to put Intuition to the proof, necessary also in order that Intuition should break itself up into concepts and so be propagated to others.  But when we use language and concepts to communicate it, we tend to make these in themselves mean something, whereas they are but counters or symbols used to express what is their inspiration—­Intuition.  Hence we often forget the metaphysical Intuitions from which science itself has sprung.  What is relative in science is the symbolic knowledge, reached by pre-existing concepts which proceed from the fixed to the moving.  A truly intuitive philosophy would bring science and metaphysics together.  Modern science dates from the day when mobility was set up as an independent reality and studied as such by Galileo.  But men of science have mainly fixed their attention on the concepts, the residual products of Intuition, the symbols