Bergson and His Philosophy eBook

John Alexander Gunn
This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 229 pages of information about Bergson and His Philosophy.

Bergson and His Philosophy eBook

John Alexander Gunn
This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 229 pages of information about Bergson and His Philosophy.
assumes when our Ego lets itself live, when it refrains from separating its present state from its former states.  For this purpose, it need not be entirely absorbed in the passing sensation or idea, for then, on the contrary, it would no longer ‘endure.’  Nor need it forget its former states; it is enough that in recalling these states, it does not set them alongside its actual state as one point alongside another, but forms both the past and the present states into an organic whole, as happens when we recall the notes of a tune, melting, so to speak, into one another.  Might it not be said that even if these notes succeed one another, yet, we perceive them in one another, and that their totality may be compared to a living being whose parts, although distinct, permeate one another just because they are so closely connected?” [Footnote:  Time and Free Will, p. 100 (Fr. p. 76).] Such a duration is Real Time.  Unfortunately, we, obsessed by the idea of space, introduce it unwittingly and set our states of consciousness side by side in such a way as to perceive them alongside one another; in a word, we project them into space and we express duree in terms of extensity and succession thus takes the form of a continuous line or a chain—­the parts of which touch without interpenetrating one another. [Footnote:  Time and Free Will, p. 100 (Fr. p. 76).] Thus is brought to birth that mongrel form, that hybrid conception of False Time criticized above.  Real Time, la duree, is not, however, susceptible like False Time to measurement, for it is, strictly speaking, not quantitative in character, but is rather a qualitative multiplicity.  “Real Duration (la duree reele) is just what has always been called Time, but it is Time perceived as indivisible.” [Footnote:  La Perception du Changement, p. 26.  Cf. the whole of the Second Lecture.] Certainly pure consciousness does not perceive Time as a sum of units of duration, for, left to itself, it has no means and even no reason to measure Time, but a feeling which lasted only half the number of days, for example, would no longer be the same feeling for it.  It is true that when we give this feeling a certain name, when we treat it as a thing, we believe that we can diminish its duration by half, for example, and also halve the duration of all the rest of our history.  It seems that it would still be the same life only on a reduced scale.  But we forget that states of consciousness are processes and not things; that they are alive and therefore constantly changing, and that, in consequence, it is impossible to cut off a moment from them without making them poorer by the loss of some impression and thus altering their quality. [Footnote:  Time and Free Will, p. 196 (Fr. p. 150).] La duree appears as a “wholly qualitative multiplicity, an absolute heterogeneity of elements which pass over into one another.” [Footnote:  Time and Free Will, p. 229 (Fr. p. 176).] Such a time cannot be measured by clocks or dials but only by conscious beings, for “it is the very stuff of which life and consciousness are made.”  Intellect does not grasp Real Time—­we can only have an intuition of it.  “We do not think Real Time—­but we live it because life transcends intellect.”

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Bergson and His Philosophy from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.