must be a phenomenon of quite other order than Perception, since between presence and absence there are no degrees, no intermediate stages."[Footnote:  Matter and Memory, p. 315 (Fr. p. 264).] If we maintain that recollection is merely a weakened form of Perception we must note the consequences of such a thesis.  “If recollection is only a weakened Perception, inversely, Perception must be something like an intenser Memory.  Now, the germ of English Idealism is to be found here.  This Idealism consists in finding only a difference of degree and not of kind, between the reality of the object perceived, and the ideality of the object conceived."[Footnote:  Matter and Memory, p. 318 (Fr. p. 267).] The maintenance of such a doctrine involves the further remarkable contention that “we construct matter from our own interior states and that perception is only a true hallucination."[Footnote:  Matter and Memory, p 318 (Fr. p. 267).] Such a theory will not harmonize with the experienced difference between Perceptions and Memories.[Footnote:  Le Souvenir du present et la fausse reconnaissance, Revue philosophique, Dec., 1908, p. 568; also L’Energie spirituelle (Mind-Energy).] We do not mistake the perception of a slight sound for the recollection of a loud noise, as has already been remarked.  The consciousness of a recollection “never occurs as a weak state which we try to relegate to the past so soon as we become aware of its weakness.  How indeed, unless we already possess the representation of a past, previously lived, could we relegate to it the less intense psychical states, when it would be so simple to set them alongside of strong states as a present experience more confused, beside a present experience more distinct?"[Footnote:  Matter and Memory, p. 319 (Fr. p. 268).] The truth is that Memory does not consist in a regression from the present into the past, but on the contrary, in a progress from the past to the present.  Memory is radically distinct from Perception, in its character.

Bergson then passes on to discuss other views of Memory, and in particular, those which deal with the nature of Memory and its relation to the brain.  It is stated dogmatically by some that Memory is a function of the brain.  Others claim, in opposition to this, that Memory is something other than a function of the brain.  Between two such statements as these, compromise or reconciliation is obviously impossible.  It is then for experience to decide between these two conflicting views.  This empirical appeal Bergson does not shirk.  He has made a most comprehensive and intensive study of pathological phenomena relating to the mental malady known as aphasia.  This particular type of disorder belongs to a whole class of mental diseases known as amnesia.  Now amnesia (in Greek, “forgetfulness”) is literally any loss or defect of the Memory.  Aphasia (in Greek “absence of speech”) is a total or partial loss of the power of speech, either in its spoken or written form.