Had he chosen to take the initiative, in order to prevent what ultimately happened, he would not have failed for want of means.  When the army and the administration are in a man’s hands, he can do very much as he chooses.  Successive revolutions have destroyed all respect among us, except respect for main force; and it is a true saying that if strength begets respect, respect in its turn begets affection.  But the King, who was the most moderate of men, would not go beyond legal limits except as a last resource.  And this characteristic of his was well and universally known to all, both to friends and foes.  While it discouraged the former, it to some extent encouraged the latter, and so the signal for recourse to force came from below, the pretorians of the street rose in rebellion, and the defenders of the law were everywhere overcome.  In a few moments the confusion became general, and the revolution was an accomplished fact.

And yet, even so late in the day, in other countries than our own indeed, generals, and others invested with the chief command of the national troops, have been known to draw their swords and save their sovereigns and their governments almost in spite of their own selves.  They have been known to maintain the tutelary and inviolable principle of a traditional monarchy—­a principle which is both ancient and absolute, tracing the line of duty for all men, clear and indisputable, without any possibility of hesitation or compromise—­against and in the face of all comers.  And this principle is one which calls forth the proudest devotion, seeing it is impersonal, for the king is not the elected leader of conquerors, oppressing the conquered, but a living flag, the national rallying-point for all the defenders of the mother country against her enemies, whether within or without her borders.

This saving process, whether the saved ones would or no, has been seen, as I say, in other countries, which thus were preserved from that discord, disorganisation, and disaster of every kind, which are the inevitable consequence of internal convulsion and revolution.

But the July Monarchy was unhappily very far from representing the traditional hereditary principle.  Born of one insurrection, it was overthrown by another.  Set up on the electoral principle, it fell, as though in mockery, with a full electoral majority behind it.  Two-and-twenty years later the empire too fell, on the very morrow of a triumphant plebiscite.  Partial and universal suffrage alike have proved their impotence to defend a government which has ceased to give satisfaction against the assaults of that army shouting “Get out of that and let me take your place!” the members of which always make themselves up as austere patriots.  And I cannot help, in this place, looking sadly back at the fatal consequences which this impotence of the elective, as compared with the monarchical regime, has had for us.  Why did the Emperor refuse to treat with M. de Bismarck in the name of France,