During the night, Lee came to the conclusion that he must absolutely rid himself of Sedgwick, before he could again assault Hooker’s defences.  And, trusting to what he had already seen, in this campaign, of his opponent’s lack of enterprise, he detailed Anderson’s remaining three brigades to the forces opposing Sedgwick’s wing, leaving only Jackson’s corps, now numbering some nineteen thousand men, to keep Hooker, with his eighty thousand, penned up behind his breastworks, while himself repaired to the battle-ground of Monday at Salem Church, with the intention of driving Sedgwick across the river, so that he might again concentrate all his powers upon our forces near Chancellorsville.

By daylight Monday morning, Early advanced from his position at Cox’s, and with very little difficulty recaptured the heights, held by only a few of Gibbon’s men.  Barksdale was again posted in the trenches, and instructed to keep Gibbon in check.  Early meanwhile moved out to join McLaws, feeling our position with Smith’s brigade, and ascertaining the left of our line to lie near Taylor’s, and to extend from there down to the plank road.

At an early hour on Monday morning, it came to Sedgwick’s knowledge, that the Confederates had re-occupied the heights in his rear, and cut him off from Fredericksburg, thus leaving him only Banks’s Ford as a possible outlet in case of disaster.  An attempt was made by Early to throw a force about Howe’s left, and seize the approaches to the ford; but it was timely met, and repulsed by our men, who captured in this affair two hundred prisoners and a battle-flag.  And, to forestall any serious movement to cut him off from Banks’s Ford, Sedgwick had already formed Howe’s division in line to the rear, extending, as we have seen, from the river to the plank road.

In his report, and particularly in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Howe speaks as if he had received from Sedgwick only general—­in fact, vague—­and rare instructions, as to the dispositions to be made of his division; and that all his particular manoeuvres were originated and completed on his own responsibility, upon information, or mere hints, from headquarters of the corps.  His line, over two miles long, was covered by less than six thousand men.

The despatch from Warren reached Sedgwick while matters were in this condition.  To retire to Fredericksburg was impossible; to retire across Banks’s Ford, except by night, equally so, unless he chose to hazard a disastrous attack from the superior force in his front.  For Sedgwick had scarce twenty thousand men left to confront Lee’s twenty-five thousand, and imagined the odds to be far greater.  Our line was formed with the left on the river, midway between Fredericksburg and Banks’s Ford, running southerly to beyond the plank road, following this on the south side for nearly two miles, and then turning north to the crest which Wheaton had held the night