It was a very foggy night; which circumstance, added to the fact that Sedgwick was, in common with all our generals, only imperfectly familiar with the lay of the land, and that the enemy, active and well-informed, enveloped him with a curtain of light troops, to harass his movement in whatever direction, materially contributed to the delay which ensued.

And Sedgwick appears to have encountered Early’s pickets, and to have done some skirmishing with the head of his column, immediately after passing west of Franklin’s Crossing, which, moreover, gave rise to some picket-firing all along the line, as far as Deep Run, where Bartlett confronted the enemy.  As the outskirts of the town were entered, four regiments of Wheaton’s and Shaler’s brigades were sent forward against the rifle-pits of the enemy, and a gallant assault was made by them.  But it was repulsed, with some loss, by the Confederates, who, as on Dec. 13, patiently lay behind the stone wall and rifle-pits, and reserved their fire until our column was within twenty yards.  Then the regiments behind the stone wall, followed by the guns and infantry on the heights, opened a fire equally sudden and heavy, and drove our columns back upon the main body.  The assault had been resolute, as the casualties testify, “one regiment alone losing sixty-four men in as many seconds” (Wheaton); but the darkness, and uncertainty of our officers with regard to the position, made its failure almost a foregone conclusion.  This was about daylight.  “The force displayed by the enemy was sufficient to show that the intrenchments could not be carried except at great cost.” (Sedgwick.)

The officer by whom the order to Sedgwick had been sent, Capt.  Raderitzchin, had not been regularly appointed in orders, but was merely a volunteer aide-de-camp on Gen. Hooker’s staff.

Shortly after he had been despatched, Gen. Warren requested leave himself to carry a duplicate of the order to Sedgwick, (Capt.  Raderitzchin being “a rather inexperienced, headlong young man,”) for Warren feared the “bad effect such an impossible order would have on Gen. Sedgwick and his commanders, when delivered by him.”  And, knowing Warren to be more familiar with the country than any other available officer, Hooker detached him on this duty, with instructions again to impress upon Sedgwick the urgent nature of the orders.  Warren, with an aide, left headquarters about midnight, and reached Sedgwick before dawn.

As daylight approached, Warren thought he could see that only two field-pieces were on Marye’s heights, and that no infantry was holding the rifle-pits to our right of it.  But the stone-wall breastworks were held in sufficient force, as was demonstrated by the repulse of the early assault of Shaler and Wheaton.

And Warren was somewhat in error.  Barksdale, who occupied Fredericksburg, had been closely scanning these movements of Sedgwick’s.  He had some fourteen hundred men under his command.  Six field-pieces were placed near the Marye house.  Several full batteries were on Lee’s hill, and near Howison’s.  And, so soon as Fredericksburg was occupied by our forces, Early sent Hays to re-enforce Barksdale; one regiment of his brigade remaining on Barksdale’s right, and the balance proceeding to Stansbury’s.