It is not astonishing that Mr. Lincoln, or the Washington pseudo-strategists who were his military advisers, could not distinguish, in selecting a chief who should be capable of leading the Army of the Potomac to victory, between the gallant corps-commander, who achieves brilliant results under limited responsibility, and the leader, upon whose sole resources of mind and courage devolve not only the instruction for health, equipment, rationing, march, or attack, of each of his subordinates, but the graver weight of prompt and correct decision and immediate action under every one of the kaleidoscopic changes of a campaign or a battle-field.  It required more knowledge of the requisites of war, as well as a broader judgment of character, than Mr. Lincoln had had opportunity to form of the several soldiers of the army, to insure a happy choice.

And, doubtless, Hooker’s self-assertiveness, success as a brigade, division, and corps commander, and decided appearance of large ability, shared equally in procuring his appointment.  No one will deny Hooker’s capacity in certain directions, or up to a given test.  His whole career shows an exceptional power in “riding to orders.”  But he sadly lacked that rare combination of qualities and reserve power necessary to lead a hundred and twenty-five thousand men against such a foe as Lee.

Nothing shows more curiously a weak spot in Hooker’s character than the odd pride he took in Mr. Lincoln’s somewhat equivocal letter to him at the time of his appointment, here following:—­

ExecutiveMansion, Washington, D.C.,
Jan. 26, 1863. 
Major-gen.  Hooker.

General,—­I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac.  Of course, I have done this upon what appears to me to be sufficient reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know that there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you.  I believe you to be a brave and skilful soldier, which of course I like.  I also believe you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right.  You have confidence in yourself; which is a valuable, if not an indispensable, quality.  You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm; but I think that during Gen. Burnside’s command of the army, you have taken counsel of your ambition, and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country and to a most meritorious and honorable brother-officer.  I have heard, in such way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the Government needed a dictator.  Of course, it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command.  Only those generals who gain success can set up dictators.  What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship.  The Government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has