Three batteries of Whipple’s division had remained in the Hazel Grove clearing while the infantry had advanced towards the Furnace.  When the rout of the Eleventh Corps became clear, these eighteen guns were ordered in battery, facing about north-west, by their commander, Capt.  Huntington, and kept up a heavy fire upon the woods through which Jackson was pushing his way.  Pleasonton, for his part, trained Martin’s horse-battery in the same direction.  Other guns were later added to these, and all expended a good deal of ammunition on the enemy’s lines.  But there was no fighting at Hazel Grove rising to the distinction of a battle.  The importance given to it by Sickles and Pleasonton is not borne out by the facts.  There was no Federal loss, to speak of; nor do the Confederate reports make any comment upon this phase of the battle.  They probably supposed these guns to be an extension of the line of batteries at Fairview.  As such they were, without question, of no inconsiderable use.

Meanwhile Birney, sending word to Barlow that they run danger of being cut off, and detailing the Twentieth Indiana and Sixty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers as rearguard, rejoins Sickles and Pleasonton in the clearing, and both move up to sustain his flank.

So soon as Jackson’s guns gave Lee the intimation of his assault, the latter advanced upon the Union line with sufficient vigor to prevent Hooker from sending re-enforcements to his right.  The attack was sharp; and a general inclination to the left was ordered, to connect with Jackson’s right as the latter brought his columns nearer.  “These orders were well executed, our troops advancing up to the enemy’s intrenchments, while several batteries played with good effect upon his lines until prevented by increasing darkness.” (Lee.)

McLaws reports:  “My orders were to hold my position, not to engage seriously, but to press strongly so soon as it was discovered that Gen. Jackson had attacked . . . when I ordered an advance along the whole line to engage with the skirmishers, which were largely re-enforced, and to threaten, but not attack seriously; in doing which Gen. Wofford became so seriously engaged, that I directed him to withdraw, which was done in good order, his men in good spirits, after driving the enemy to their intrenchments.”

The movement of Anderson towards the left made a gap of considerable distance in the Confederate line “but the skirmishers of Gen. Semmes, the entire Tenth Georgia, were perfectly reliable, and kept the enemy to his intrenchments.”

These accounts vary in no wise from those of the Union generals, who held their positions in front of both Anderson and McLaws, and kept inside their field-works.

Meade, whose line on the left of the army was not disturbed, sent Sykes’s division, so soon as the Eleventh Corps rout became known to him, to the junction of the roads to Ely’s and United-States Fords, to hold that point at all hazards, and form a new right flank.  This was done with Sykes’s accustomed energy.  Nor was he reached by Jackson’s line, and before morning Reynolds fell in upon his right.