Col.  Miles says his line was constantly engaged skirmishing with the enemy during the day.  At about three P.M. the Confederates massed troops in two columns, one on each side the road, flanked by a line some eight hundred yards long, in the woods.  An impetuous charge was made to within twenty yards of the abattis, but it was baffled by our sturdy front.

Sickles, then still in reserve, had made a reconnoissance early on Saturday, in Hancock’s front, with the Eleventh Massachusetts and Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania Volunteers, covered by some sharpshooters; had driven in the enemy’s pickets, and found him, to all appearances, in force.  This was Anderson’s line.

The Twelfth Corps had also made a reconnoissance down the plank road later in the day, but with no immediate results.

All that was accomplished was a mere feeling of the other’s lines by either force.  Hooker vainly endeavored to ascertain Lee’s strength at various places in his front.  Lee, to good purpose, strove to amuse Hooker by his bustle and stir, to deceive him as to the weakness of his force, and to gain time.

During the afternoon of Saturday, Hooker had a rare chance of redeeming his error made, the day before, in withdrawing from the open country to the Wilderness, and of dealing a fatal blow to his antagonist.  He knew that Jackson, with twenty-five thousand men, was struggling through difficult roads towards his right.  Whatever his object, the division of Lee’s forces was a fact.  He knew that there could be left in his front not more than an equal number.  It was actually less than eighteen thousand men; but Hooker, with his knowledge of Lee’s strength, could not estimate it at more than twenty-five thousand by any calculation he could make.  Himself had over seventy thousand men in line, and ready to mass on any given point.  He ought to have known that Lee was too astute a tactician seriously to attack him in front, while Jackson was manoeuvring to gain his right.  And all Lee’s conduct during the day was palpable evidence that he was seeking to gain time.

However much Hooker may have believed that Jackson was retreating, he was bound to guard against the possibility of an attack, knowing as he did Jackson’s whereabouts and habit of rapid mystery.  Had he thrown the entire Eleventh Corps en potence to his main line, as above indicated, to arrest or retard an attack if made; had he drawn troops from Meade on the extreme left, where half an hour’s reconnoitring would have shown that nothing was in his front, and from Couch’s reserves in the centre; had he thrown heavy columns out where Birney was, to prevent the re-union of Jackson and Lee, and to make a determined attack upon the latter’s left while Hancock pressed him in front,—­half the vigor displayed in the early days of this movement would have crushed the Army of Northern Virginia beyond recovery for this campaign.  Lee’s only salvation would have lain in instant withdrawal from our front, and a retreat towards Gordonsville to re-unite with his lieutenant.