When Sickles’s attack, leading to the capture of the Twenty-third Georgia, was made, Col.  Brown’s battalion of Confederate artillery happened to be within reach, and was speedily ordered up by Jackson, and placed on a cleared eminence south of the railroad cutting.  Here, gathering a few detached companies in support, he opened smartly upon Sickles.  The latter, bearing in mind his orders impressing caution in his advance, was for the moment checked, long enough, at all events, to enable Jackson’s trains to get out of reach by the lower road.

Birney had barely reached the Furnace when Brown’s fire became quite annoying.  He accordingly placed Livingstone’s, and afterwards Randolph’s, batteries in position, and spent some time in silencing the Confederate guns; after accomplishing which, he threw forward his skirmishers, and occupied Welford’s house, while Graham, with four regiments, got possession of the railroad cutting.

By this time Jackson’s troops had passed a couple of miles beyond the Furnace; but on hearing of Sickles’s attack, and the capture of an entire regiment, Archer, who commanded the rear brigade, promptly retraced his steps with his own and Thomas’s brigades, and supported Brown’s excellent work.  So soon as the trains had got well along, these two brigades rejoined their command; and their work as rear-guard was undertaken by Posey, and subsequently by Wright, whom Anderson ordered out, and threw across his own left flank to engage the attention of Sickles’s column.

Jackson’s divisions were well out of reach, a half-dozen miles from Sickles, before this officer was ready for an advance in force.  Jackson had marched on, or parallel to, the Brock road.  When he reached the Orange plank road, he was shown an eminence from which he could observe the position of the Union lines.  Riding up alone, so as not to attract attention, after—­as Cooke affirms—­driving the Federal cavalry from the spot, he examined our position carefully; and, seeing that he was not yet abreast of our flank on this road, he ordered his troops farther along the Brock road to the old turnpike.

But he sent Fitz Hugh Lee’s cavalry, supported by Paxton, along the plank road, to hold it in case his designs were prematurely discovered and met.

By four P.M. he had reached the right and rear of the Union line; while Hooker complacently viewed the situation from his comfortable headquarters at the Chancellor house, apparently in a semi-torpid state, retaining just enough activity to initiate manoeuvres, which, under the circumstances, were the most unfortunate possible.

For not only had he robbed his right corps of Barlow’s brigade, the only general reserve of the “key of his position,” as himself has called it, and despatched Birney two miles into the woods, supported by Whipple, and protected on the left by Williams; but about five P.M. he ordered Geary from his position on Slocum’s left, to move forward, and make an attack down the plank road.  This order Geary carried out in person with several regiments.  He had a smart skirmish with the enemy, and was considerably advanced, when, about sundown, he was suddenly ordered to return to his position.