On the other hand, Hooker had shown clear intention of fighting a defensive battle; and perhaps Lee measured his man better than the Army of the Potomac had done.  And he knew Jackson too.  Should Hooker remain quiet during the day, either voluntarily or by Lee’s engrossing his attention by constant activity in his front, the stratagem might succeed.  And in case of failure, each wing had open ground and good roads for retreat, to form a junction towards Gordonsville.

Moreover, nothing better presented itself; and though, in the presence of a more active foe, Lee would never have hazarded so much, the very aggressiveness of the manoeuvre, and the success of Jackson’s former flank attacks, commended it to Lee, and he gave his lieutenant orders to proceed to its immediate execution.

For this division of his forces in the presence of an enemy of twice his strength, Lee is not entitled to commendation.  It is justifiable only—­if at all—­by the danger of the situation, which required a desperate remedy, and peculiarly by the success which attended it.  Had it resulted disastrously, as it ought to have done, it would have been a serious blow to Lee’s military prestige.  The “nothing venture, nothing have” principle applies to it better than any maxim of tactics.

Before daybreak Jackson sends two of his aides, in company with some local guides, to find a practicable road, by which he may, with the greatest speed and all possible secrecy, gain the position he aims at on Hooker’s right and rear, and immediately sets his corps in motion, with Rodes, commanding D. H. Hill’s division, in the advance, and A. P. Hill bringing up the rear.

Jackson’s route lay through the woods, along the road on which rested Lee’s line.  His corps, since Friday’s manoeuvres, was on the left; and, as he withdrew his troops at dawn, Lee deployed to the left to fill the gap, first placing Wright where Jackson had been on the west of the plank road, and later, when Wright was ordered to oppose Sickles at the Furnace, Mahone’s brigade.

This wood-road led to Welford’s or Catherine’s Furnace, from which place a better one, called the Furnace road, zigzagged over to join the Brock (or Brook) road, the latter running northerly into Y-shaped branches, each of which intersected the pike a couple of miles apart.

Jackson was obliged to make some repairs to the road as he advanced, for the passage of his artillery and trains.  In many places the bottom, none too reliable at any time, was so soft with the recent rains, that it had to be corduroyed to pull the guns through.  But these men were used to marches of unequalled severity, and their love for their leader made no work too hard when “Old Jack” shared it with them.  And although they had already been marching and fighting continuously for thirty hours, this circuit of well-nigh fifteen miles was cheerfully done, with an alacrity nothing but willing and courageous hearts, and a blind belief that they were outwitting their enemy, could impart.