As a position to resist a southerly attack, it was as good as the Wilderness afforded; although the extreme right rested on no obstacle which superiority in numbers could not overcome.  And a heavy force, massed in the clearing at Dowdall’s as a point d’appui, was indispensable to safety, inasmuch as the conformation of the ground afforded nothing for this flank to lean upon.

Having forfeited the moral superiority gained by his advance, having withdrawn to his intrenchments at Chancellorsville, and decided, after surprising his enemy, upon fighting a defensive battle, Hooker, early on Saturday morning, examined his lines, and made sundry changes in the forces under his command.

The position he occupied, according to Gen. Lee, was one of great natural strength, on ground covered with dense forest and tangled under-growth, behind breastworks of logs and an impenetrable abattis, and approached by few roads, all easily swept by artillery.  And, while it is true that the position was difficult to carry by direct assault, full compensation existed in other tactical advantages to the army taking the offensive.  It is not probable that Lee, in Hooker’s place, would have selected such ground.  “Once in the wood, it was difficult to tell any thing at one hundred yards.  Troops could not march without inextricable confusion.”  Despite which fact, however, the density of these very woods was the main cause of Lee’s success.

In this position, Hooker awaited the assault of his vigorous opponent.  As in all defensive battles, he was at certain disadvantages, and peculiarly so in this case, owing to the terrain he had chosen, or been forced to choose by Friday’s easily accepted check.  There were no debouches for throwing forces upon Lee, should he wish to assume the offensive.  There was no ground for manoeuvring.  The woods were like a heavy curtain in his front.  His left wing was placed so as to be of absolutely no value.  His right flank was in the air.  One of the roads on which he must depend for retreat was readily assailable by the enemy.  And he had in his rear a treacherous river, which after a few hours’ rain might become impassable, with but a single road and ford secured to him with reasonable certainty.

And, prone as we had always been to act upon unwarrantable over-estimates of the strength of our adversaries, Hooker had not this reason to allege for having retired to await Lee’s attack.  For he had just received excellent information from Richmond, to the effect that Lee’s rations amounted to fifty-nine thousand daily; and we have seen that he told Slocum, on Thursday, that his column of nearly forty thousand men was much stronger than any force Lee could detach against him.  Hooker acknowledges as much in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, when, in answer to the question, “What portion of the enemy lay between you and Gen. Sedgwick?” he replied:—­