This was not a valid conclusion from the actual facts.  Listen to his subordinates’ statements.

Gen. Humphreys testifies before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, with reference to this falling-back:  “It was totally unexpected to me:  I thought it was part of the plan to attack him as quickly as possible.  We had surprised them, and were strong enough to attack them.”  “After Friday I was apprehensive we should not have the success we had expected.”  “I think it was a mistake to fight a defensive battle after surprising the enemy.”  “I think we should have attacked the enemy immediately.”  “I must give my opinion, since you ask me; for I have an opinion, as a military man, from the general facts I know, and that I suppose I am obliged to express.  My opinion is that we should not have been withdrawn, called back, on Friday afternoon.  We had advanced along the road to Fredericksburg to attack the enemy:  the troops were in fine spirits, and we wanted to fight a battle.  I think we ought to have fought the enemy there.  They came out, and attacked one division of the corps I belonged to, just at the time we returned to Chancellorsville.  What caused Gen. Hooker to return after advancing some miles on this general position, which was about perpendicular to the plank road leading to Fredericksburg, I am not able to say, because, being only a division commander, the facts were not stated to me.  But I have heard it said that he received some erroneous information about the enemy’s advancing on his flank from the direction of Orange Court House.  It was my opinion, we should have attacked the enemy, instead of withdrawing, and awaiting an attack from the enemy.”

He also testifies, that, after the troops were ordered back to Chancellorsville, they were for many hours massed there in considerable confusion, until, after a deal of counter-marching, they were got into place.

Pleasonton states that the retreat from open ground “produced among the soldiers a feeling of uncertainty.”

Hancock testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War:  “I consider the mistake in the matter was in even stopping at Chancellorsville. . . .  I believe, if all . . . had pushed right down to Banks’s Ford, the whole movement would have been a perfect success.  But I have no doubt that we ought to have held our advance positions, and still kept pushing on, and attempt to make a junction with Gen. Sedgwick.”

Gen. Warren, whose whole testimony and report are the clearest and most useful of all the evidence obtainable from any single source, on this campaign, suggested to Couch, who was supporting Sykes on Friday, when the latter was attacked by Jackson, to delay carrying out Hooker’s orders to retire, while he (Warren) galloped back to headquarters to explain the importance of holding the position, which was formidable and had great tactical advantages.  Hooker yielded; but, before Warren could get back to the front, the previous orders had been obeyed, and the position lost.  He says:  “I never should have stopped at Chancellorsville.  I should have advanced and fought the enemy, instead of waiting for him to attack me.  The character of the country was the great reason for advancing.”