From Saturday at 8 A.M. till Sunday noon, some twenty-eight hours, Hooker with seventy-five thousand, and, after the arrival of the First Corps, nearly ninety thousand men, lay between the separated wings of Lee’s army of twenty-four thousand and seventeen thousand men respectively, being all the while cognizant of the facts.  Had ever a general a better chance to whip his enemy in detail?  And yet we were badly beaten in this fight.  Now, if loyalty to Hooker requires us to believe that his conduct of this campaign was even respectable, it follows that the Army of the Potomac, respectably led, could be defeated by the Army of Northern Virginia, two to one.  Will the soldiers of the ever-faithful army accept this as an explanation of our defeat?

Again:  from Sunday noon till Monday at 9 A.M., twenty-one hours, Hooker, with over eighty thousand men, was held in the White House lines by a force of twenty-seven thousand.  If loyalty to Hooker requires us to believe that this was even respectable generalship, it follows that the Army of the Potomac, well led, could be defeated by the Army of Northern Virginia, three to one.  Shall we accept this as an explanation of our defeat?

Again:  from Monday at 9 A.M. till Tuesday at 4 P.M., thirty-one hours, against the advice of all his corps commanders except Sickles and Couch (the latter agreeing to retreat only because he felt that the army would be defeated under Hooker whatever they might do), Hooker, with eighty thousand men, was held in the White House lines by a force of nineteen thousand, while the rest turned upon and demolished Sedgwick.  If loyalty to Hooker requires us to believe that this was even respectable generalship, it follows that the Army of the Potomac, well led, could be defeated by the Army of Northern Virginia, four to one.  Shall we accept this as an explanation of our defeat?

If there is in the world’s military history a parallel to this extraordinary generalship, for which any one who has even pretended to study the art of war is able to find an excuse, I have failed to find such an instance in the course of many years’ reading, and shall be happy to have it pointed out to me.  Hooker’s wound cannot be alleged in extenuation.  If he was disabled, his duty was to turn the command over to Couch, the next in rank.  If he did not do this, he was responsible for what followed.  And he retained the command himself, only using Couch as his mouthpiece.

I have always maintained, that, man for man, the Army of the Potomac was at any time the equal of the Army of Northern Virginia, and that, man for man, the old Third Corps has proved itself good for Jackson’s in its palmiest days.  When, therefore, the Army of the Potomac was, as here, defeated or bottled up by one-half, one-third, or one-quarter its force of the enemy, my loyalty to that army demands that I seek a reason other than Hooker’s alleged lack of heart of his subordinate officers.  And this