They also claim that this column seized all the property that could be of use, found in their line of march.  “The citizens were in many cases entirely stripped of the necessaries of life.”

Stoneman certainly misconceived his orders.  These were plainly enough to throw his main body in Lee’s rear, so as substantially to cut his communications by the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad.  To accomplish this, he was to mask his movement by a body of troops, which should keep whatever Confederate cavalry there might be in the vicinity of Orange Court House and Gordonsvile, busy, until his main column was beyond their reach, and then should rejoin him; and to select a rallying point on the Pamunkey, so as to be near the important scene of operations.  Every thing was to be subordinate to cutting the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad.

If Stoneman had properly digested his orders, and had pushed night and day for any available point on the Fredericksburg and Richmond Railroad, he might have reached it by Sunday.  A thorough destruction of Lee’s line of supply and retreat, would no doubt have so decidedly affected his strength, actual and moral, as to have seriously changed the vigor of his operations against both Hooker and Sedgwick.

Stoneman barely had time, from the lateness of his date of starting, to accomplish great results before Hooker was substantially beaten; but it would appear that he could have materially contributed to lessen the disastrous nature of the defeat, if no more.

His movements were characterized by great weakness.  He did not seem to understand, that safety as well as success depended upon moving with a body large enough to accomplish results.  Instead of this, he sent, to perform the most important work, bodies so small as to be unable to destroy bridges, when guarded by a few companies of infantry and a couple of guns.

And the damage done appears to have all been repaired by the time the raiders got back to camp.

Hooker’s criticism in this instance is quite just:  “On the 4th, the cavalry column, under Gen. Stoneman, commenced its return.  One party of it, under Gen. Kilpatrick, crossed the Aquia and Richmond Railroad; and the fact that on the 5th, the cars carried the rebel wounded and our prisoners over the road to Richmond, will show to what extent the enemy’s communications had been interrupted.  An examination of the instructions Gen. Stoneman received, in connection with the official report of his operations, fully sustains me in saying that no officer ever made a greater mistake in construing his orders, and no one ever accomplished less in so doing.  The effect of throwing his body of cavalry in the rear of the enemy, and on his communications, at the time it was in his power to have done it, can readily be estimated.  But instead, that important arm of the army became crippled to an extent which seriously embarrassed me in my subsequent operations.  Soon after, Gen. Stoneman applied for and obtained a sick-leave; and I requested that it might be indefinitely extended to him.  It is charitable to suppose that Gens.  Stoneman and Averell did not read their orders, and determined to carry on operations in conformity with their own views and inclinations.”