Col.  Wyndham moved on to Columbia, where he rendered useless a large amount of stores, a number of canal-boats, and several bridges over the James-River canal.  For lack of blasting-materials he was unable to destroy the aqueduct over the Rivanna river.  It was solid enough to have delayed him at least forty-eight hours.  The bridge over the James river to Elk Island he burned, and damaged the locks and gates of the canal as far as possible.  He returned to Thompson’s Cross-roads the same day with W. H. Fitz Lee at his heels.

Capt.  Harrison, with a part of Buford’s reserves, had, on May 4, somewhat of a skirmish with the enemy at Fleming’s Cross-roads; but without effect upon the movements of the command.  And another squadron crossed sabres with the enemy at Shannon’s.

Such prisoners as were captured by any of the parties, were paroled at the time.  A considerable number captured by Stoneman were sent to Richmond in one party, with word that the Union cavalry was following close upon them.

To quote Stoneman’s own reasons, the six days’ rations with which he left camp, having now been consumed, (though it would seem that there had been ample opportunity to collect as much more as was necessary from the stores destroyed); Hooker not having come up as expected; vague rumors having reached him of the defeat of the Army of the Potomac; having accomplished, as he deemed, all that he was sent to do; Averell having been withdrawn, thus leaving Lee ready to attack him,—­Stoneman sent Buford with six hundred and fifty picked men to the vicinity of Gordonsville, and a small party out the Bowling-Green road, and marched his main body to Orange Court House.

At noon of the 6th, he assembled his entire command at Orange Springs; thence marched to Raccoon Ford, and crossed on the 7th.

On the 8th, the command crossed the Rappahannock at Kelly’s, having to swim about twenty yards.

Leaving Buford to guard the river from the railroad to Falmouth, he then returned to camp.

During the latter part of the time occupied by these movements, the roads had been in very bad order from the heavy rains of the 5th.

Hotchkiss and Allen say, with reference to this raid:  “This failure is the more surprising from the fact that Gen. Lee had but two regiments of cavalry, those under W. H. Fitz Lee, to oppose to the large force under Stoneman, consisting of ten or eleven thousand men.  The whole country in rear of the Confederate Army, up to the very fortifications of Richmond, was open to the invader.  Nearly all the transportation of that army was collected at Guineas depot, eighteen miles from Chancellorsville, with little or no guard, and might have been destroyed by one-fourth of Stoneman’s force.”

And further:—­

“Such was the condition of the railroads and the scarcity of supplies in the country, that the Confederate commander could never accumulate more than a few days’ rations ahead at Fredericksburg.  To have interrupted his communications for any length of time, would have imperilled his army, or forced him to retreat.”