There is no particular criticism by Hooker upon Sedgwick’s authority to withdraw to the north side of the river, or upon the necessity for his so doing.  And we have seen how hard-pressed and overmatched Sedgwick had really been, and that he only withdrew when good military reasons existed, and the latest-received despatch of his superior advised him to do so.  But Hooker states that “my desire was to have Gen. Sedgwick retain a position on the south side of the river, in order that I might leave a sufficient force to hold the position I was in, and with the balance of my force re-cross the river, march down to Banks’s Ford, and turn the enemy’s position in my front by so doing.  In this, too, I was thwarted, because the messenger who bore the despatch to Sedgwick to withdraw and cover Banks’s Ford, reached Sedgwick before the one who bore the order countermanding the withdrawal.”

Hooker had indicated to Sedgwick that he wished him to take and hold a position at Taylor’s, the point where the Fredericksburg heights approach the river, above the town, and terminate.  But as these heights were by that time held by Early, and there were no pontoon-bridges there, the proposal was one Sedgwick knew could not be seriously entertained, with two-thirds of Lee’s whole army surrounding his one corps, though he did reconnoitre the ground in a vain effort to carry out his chief’s suggestions.

But was it not simpler for Hooker, who had now only Jackson’s corps in his front,—­some eighteen thousand men to eighty thousand,—­to move upon his enemy, “attack and destroy him,” and himself fall upon Lee’s rear, while Sedgwick kept him occupied at Banks’s Ford?  And Hooker had all Sunday afternoon and night, and all day Monday, to ponder and arrange for attempting this simplest of manoeuvres.

It is hard to understand how the man, who could cut out such a gigantic piece of work for his lieutenant, as Hooker did for Sedgwick, could lack the enterprise to execute so trivial a tactical movement as the one indicated.  From the stirring words, “Let your watchword be Fight, and let all your orders be Fight, Fight, fight!” of April 12, to the inertia and daze of the 4th of May, is indeed a bewildering step.  And yet Hooker, to judge from his testimony, seems to have fully satisfied himself that he did all that was to be expected of an active and intelligent commander.

The impression that an attack should have been made, prevailed among many of his subordinates.  Gen. Wadsworth thus testified before the Committee on the Conduct of the War:  “Question.—­Can you tell why it was not ordered to attack the enemy at the time Gen. Sickles with his Third Corps was driven back; or why it was not ordered to attack the next day, when you heard the sound of Gen. Sedgwick’s engagement with the enemy?  Answer.—­I have no means of knowing; at the time we were ordered to re-cross the river, so far as I could judge of the temper and spirit of the officers and men of the army, they were ready to take the offensive.  I do not know why we were withdrawn then; I think we should not have withdrawn.  I think the enemy were whipped; although they had gained certain advantages, they were so severely handled that they were weaker than we were.”