The duty here is only to cultivate our con. science, to quicken our attention to the voice of the internal judge, and to use all means to secure obedience to it, and is thus our indirect duty.

C. Of love to men

{Introduction ^paragraph 150}

Love is a matter of feeling, not of will or volition, and I cannot love because I will to do so, still less because I ought (I cannot be necessitated to love); hence there is no such thing as a duty to love.  Benevolence, however (amor benevolentiae), as a mode of action, may be subject to a law of duty.  Disinterested benevolence is often called (though very improperly) love; even where the happiness of the other is not concerned, but the complete and free surrender of all one’s own ends to the ends of another (even a superhuman) being, love is spoken of as being also our duty.  But all duty is necessitation or constraint, although it may be self-constraint according to a law.  But what is done from constraint is not done from love.

It is a duty to do good to other men according to our power, whether we love them or not, and this duty loses nothing of its weight, although we must make the sad remark that our species, alas! is not such as to be found particularly worthy of love when we know it more closely.  Hatred of men, however, is always hateful:  even though without any active hostility it consists only in complete aversion from mankind (the solitary misanthropy).  For benevolence still remains a duty even towards the manhater, whom one cannot love, but to whom we can show kindness.

To hate vice in men is neither duty nor against duty, but a mere feeling of horror of vice, the will having no influence on the feeling nor the feeling on the will.  Beneficence is a duty.  He who often practises this, and sees his beneficent purpose succeed, comes at last really to love him whom he has benefited.  When, therefore, it is said:  “Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself,” this does not mean, “Thou shalt first of all love, and by means of this love (in the next place) do him good”; but:  “Do good to thy neighbour, and this beneficence will produce in thee the love of men (as a settled habit of inclination to beneficence).”

The love of complacency (amor complacentiae,) would therefore alone be direct.  This is a pleasure immediately connected with the idea of the existence of an object, and to have a duty to this, that is, to be necessitated to find pleasure in a thing, is a contradiction.

{Introduction ^paragraph 155}

D. Of respect