There is, Sir, also a circumstance which convinces me that this mode of criminal proceeding is not, at least in the present stage of our contest, altogether expedient; which is nothing less than the conduct of those very persons who have seemed to adopt that mode by lately declaring a rebellion in Massachusetts Bay, as they had formerly addressed to have traitors brought hither, under an Act of Henry the Eighth, [Footnote:  40] for trial.  For though rebellion is declared, it is not proceeded against as such, nor have any steps been taken towards the apprehension or conviction of any individual offender, either on our late or our former Address; but modes of public coercion have been adopted, and such as have much more resemblance to a sort of qualified hostility towards an independent power than the punishment of rebellious subjects.  All this seems rather inconsistent; but it shows how difficult it is to apply these juridical ideas to our present case.

In this situation, let us seriously and coolly ponder.  What is it we have got by all our menaces, which have been many and ferocious?  What advantage have we derived from the penal laws we have passed, and which, for the time, have been severe and numerous?  What advances have we made towards our object by the sending of a force which, by land and sea, is no contemptible strength?  Has the disorder abated?  Nothing less.  When I see things in this situation after such confident hopes, bold promises, and active exertions, I cannot, for my life, avoid a suspicion that the plan itself is not correctly right. [Footnote:  41]

If, then, the removal of the causes of this spirit of American liberty be for the greater part, or rather entirely, impracticable; if the ideas of criminal process be inapplicable—­or, if applicable, are in the highest degree inexpedient; what way yet remains?  No way is open but the third and last,—­to comply with the American spirit as necessary; or, if you please, to submit to it as a necessary evil.

If we adopt this mode,—­if we mean to conciliate and concede,—­let us see of what nature the concession ought to be.  To ascertain the nature of our concession, we must look at their complaint.  The Colonies complain that they have not the characteristic mark and seal of British freedom.  They complain that they are taxed in a Parliament in which they are not represented.  If you mean to satisfy them at all, you must satisfy them with regard to this complaint.  If you mean to please any people you must give them the boon which they ask; not what you may think better for them, but of a kind totally different.  Such an act may be a wise regulation, but it is no concession; whereas our present theme is the mode of giving satisfaction.