not well satisfied with them. He that shall make
search after knowledge, let him seek it where it is
there is nothing I professe lesse. These are
but my fantasies by which I endevour not to make things
known, but my selfe. They may haply one day be
knowne unto me, or have bin at other times, according
as fortune hath brought me where they were declared
or manifested. But I remember them no more.
And if I be a man of some reading, yet I am a man of
no remembering, I conceive no certainty, except it
bee to give notice how farre the knowledge I have
of it doth now reach. Let no man busie himselfe
about the matters, but on the fashion I give them.
Let that which I borrow be survaied, and then tell
me whether I have made good choice of ornaments to
beautifie and set foorth the invention which ever
comes from mee. For I make others to relate (not
after mine owne fantasie but as it best falleth out)
what I cannot so well expresse, either through unskill
of language or want of judgement. I number not
my borrowings, but I weigh them. And if I would
have made their number to prevail, I would have had
twice as many. They are all, or almost all, of
so famous and ancient names, that me thinks they sufficiently
name themselves without mee. If in reasons, comparisons,
and arguments, I transplant any into my soile, or
confound them with mine owne, I purposely conceale
the author, thereby to bridle the rashnesse of these
hastie censures that are so headlong cast upon all
manner of compositions, namely young writings of men
yet living; and in vulgare that admit all the world
to talke of them, and which seemeth to convince the
conception and publike designe alike. I will
have them to give Plutarch a barb [Footnote:
Thrust, taunt] upon mine own lips, and vex themselves
in wronging Seneca in mee. My weaknesse must
be hidden under such great credits. I will love
him that shal trace or unfeather me; I meane through
clearenesse of judgement, and by the onely distinction
of the force and beautie of my discourses. For
my selfe, who for want of memorie am ever to seeke
how to trie and refine them by the knowledge of their
country, knowe perfectly, by measuring mine owne strength,
that my soyle is no way capable of some over-pretious
flowers that therein I find set, and that all the
fruits of my increase could not make it amends.
This am I bound to answer for if I hinder my selfe,
if there be either vanitie or fault in my discourses
that I perceive not or am not able to discerne if
they be showed me. For many faults do often escape
our eyes; but the infirmitie of judgement consisteth
in not being able to perceive them when another discovereth
them unto us. Knowledge and truth may be in us
without judgement, and we may have judgment without
them: yea, the acknowledgement of ignorance is
one of the best and surest testimonies of judgement
that I can finde. I have no other sergeant of
band to marshall my rapsodies than fortune. And
looke how my humours or conceites present themselves,