If the will seeks the law which is to determine it anywhere else than in the fitness of its maxims to be universal laws of its own dictation, consequently if it goes out of itself and seeks this law in the character of any of its objects, there always results heteronomy.  The will in that case does not give itself the law, but it is given by the object through its relation to the will.  This relation whether it rests on inclination or on conceptions of reason only admits of hypothetical imperatives:  I ought to do something because I wish for something else.  On the contrary, the moral, and therefore categorical, imperative says:  I ought to do so and so, even though I should not wish for anything else.  Ex. gr., the former says:  I ought not to lie if I would retain my reputation; the latter says:  I ought not to lie although it should not bring me the least discredit.  The latter therefore must so far abstract from all objects that they shall have no influence on the will, in order that practical reason (will) may not be restricted to administering an interest not belonging to it, but may simply show its own commanding authority as the supreme legislation.  Thus, ex. gr., I ought to endeavour to promote the happiness of others, not as if its realization involved any concern of mine (whether by immediate inclination or by any satisfaction indirectly gained through reason), but simply because a maxim which excludes it cannot be comprehended as a universal law [Footnote:  I read allgemeines instead of allgemeinem.] in one and the same volition.

Classification of all Principles of Morality which can be founded on the Conception of Heteronomy.

Here as elsewhere human reason in its pure use, so long as it was not critically examined, has first tried all possible wrong ways before it succeeded in finding the one true way.

All principles which can be taken from this point of view are either empirical or rational.  The former, drawn from the principle of happiness, are built on physical or moral feelings; the latter, drawn from the principle of perfection, are built either on the rational conception of perfection as a possible effect, or on that of an independent perfection (the will of God) as the determining cause of our will.

Empirical principles are wholly incapable of serving as a foundation for moral laws.  For the universality with which these should hold for all rational beings without distinction, the unconditional practical necessity which is thereby imposed on them, is lost when their foundation is taken from the particular constitution of human nature, or the accidental circumstances in which it is placed.  The principle of private happiness, however, is the most objectionable, not merely because it is false, and experience contradicts the supposition