Supposing, however, that there were something whose existence has in itself an absolute worth, something which, being an end in itself, could be a source of definite laws, then in this and this alone would He the source of a possible categorical imperative, i. e., a practical law.

Now I say:  man and generally any rational being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself or other rational beings, must be always regarded at the same time as an end.  All objects of the inclinations have only a conditional worth, for if the inclinations and the wants founded on them did not exist, then their object would be without value.  But the inclinations themselves being sources of want, are so far from having an absolute worth for which they should be desired, that on the contrary it must be the universal wish of every rational being to be wholly free from them.  Thus the worth of any object which is to be acquired by our action is always conditional.  Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature’s, have nevertheless, if they are irrational beings, only a relative value as means, and are therefore called things; rational beings, on the contrary, are called persons, because their very nature points them out as ends in themselves, that is as something which must not be used merely as means, and so far therefore restricts freedom of action (and is an object of respect).  These, therefore, are not merely subjective ends whose existence has a worth for us as an effect of our action but objective ends, that is things whose existence is an end in itself:  an end moreover for which no other can be substituted, which they should subserve merely as means, for otherwise nothing whatever would possess absolute worth; but if all worth were conditioned and therefore contingent, then there would be no supreme practical principle of reason whatever.

If then there is a supreme practical principle or, in respect of the human will, a categorical imperative, it must be one which, being drawn from the conception of that which is necessarily an end for every one because it is an end in itself, constitutes an objective principle of will, and can therefore serve as a universal practical law.  The foundation of this principle is:  rational nature exists as an end in itself.  Man necessarily conceives his own existence as being so; so far then this is a subjective principle of human actions.  But every other rational being regards its existence similarly, just on the same rational principle that holds for me:  [Footnote:  This proposition is here stated as a postulate.  The grounds of it will be found in the concluding section.] so that it is at the same time an objective principle, from which as a supreme practical law all laws of the will must be capable of being deduced.  Accordingly the practical imperative will be as follows:  So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only.  We will now inquire whether this can be practically carried out.