For if by his owne discourse he embrace the opinions of Xenophon or of Plato, they shall be no longer theirs, but his.  He that meerely followeth another, traceth nothing, and seeketh nothing:  Non sumus sub Rege, sibi quisque se vindicet:  [Footnote:  Sen.  Epist. xxxiii.] “We are not under a Kings command, every one may challenge himselfe, for let him at least know that he knoweth.”  It is requisite he endevour as much to feed himselfe with their conceits, as labour to learne their precepts; which, so he know how to applie, let him hardily forget, where or whence he had them.  Truth and reason are common to all, and are no more proper unto him that spake them heretofore, then unto him that shall speake them hereafter.  And it is no more according to Platoes opinion than to mine, since both he and I understand and see alike.  The Bees do here and there sucke this and cull that flower, but afterward they produce the hony, which is peculiarly their owne, then is it no more Thyme or Majoram.  So of peeces borrowed of others, he may lawfully alter, transforme, and confound them, to shape out of them a perfect peece of worke, altogether his owne; alwaies provided his judgement, his travell, [Footnote:  Travail, labor.] studie, and institution tend to nothing, but to frame the same perfect.  Let him hardily conceale where or whence he hath had any helpe, and make no shew of anything, but of that which he hath made himselfe.  Pirates, pilchers, and borrowers, make a shew of their purchases and buildings, but not of that which they have taken from others:  you see not the secret fees or bribes Lawyers take of their Clients, but you shall manifestly discover the alliances they make, the honours they get for their children, and the goodly houses they build.  No man makes open shew of his receits, but every one of his gettings.  The good that comes of studie (or at least should come) is to prove better, wiser and honester.  It is the understanding power (said Epicharmus) that seeth and heareth, it is it that profiteth all and disposeth all, that moveth, swayeth, and ruleth all:  all things else are but blind, senselesse, and without spirit.  And truly in barring him of libertie to doe any thing of himselfe, we make him thereby more servile and more coward.  Who would ever enquire of his scholler what he thinketh of Rhetorike, of Grammar, of this or of that sentence of Cicero?  Which things thoroughly fethered (as if they were oracles) are let flie into our memorie; in which both letters and syllables are substantiall parts of the subject.  To know by roat is no perfect knowledge, but to keep what one hath committed to his memories charge, is commendable:  what a man directly knoweth, that will he dispose of, without turning still to his booke or looking to his pattern.  A meere bookish sufficiencie is unpleasant.  All I expect of it is an imbellishing of my actions, and not a foundation of them, according to Platoes mind, who saith, constancie, faith, and