We have then to develop the notion of a will which deserves to be highly esteemed for itself, and is good without a view to anything further, a notion which exists already in the sound natural understanding, requiring rather to be cleared up than to be taught, and which in estimating the value of our actions always takes the first place, and constitutes the condition of all the rest.  In order to do this we will take the notion of duty, which includes that of a good will, although implying certain subjectve restrictions and hindrances.  These, however, far from concealing it, or rendering it unrecognisable, rather bring it out by contrast, and make it shine forth so much the brighter.

I omit here all actions which are already recognised as inconsistent with duty, although they may be useful for this or that purpose, for with these the question whether they are done from duty cannot arise at all, since they even conflict with it.  I also set aside those actions which really conform to duty, but to which men have no direct inclination, performing them because they are impelled thereto by some other inclination.  For in this case we can readily distinguish whether the action which agrees with duty is done from duty, or from a selfish view.  It is much harder to make this distinction when the action accords with duty, and the subject has besides a direct inclination to it.  For example, it is always a matter of duty that a dealer should not overcharge an inexperienced purchaser, and wherever there is much commerce the prudent tradesman does not overcharge, but keeps a fixed price for everyone, so that a child buys of him as well as any other.  Men are thus honestly served; but this is not enough to make us believe that the tradesman has so acted from duty and from principles of honesty:  his own advantage required it; it is out of the question in this case to suppose that he might besides have a direct inclination in favour of the buyers, so that, as it were, from love he should give no advantage to one over another.  Accordingly the action was done neither from duty nor from direct inclination, but merely with a selfish view.

On the other hand, it is a duty to maintain one’s life; and, in addition, everyone has also a direct inclination to do so.  But on this account the often anxious care which most men take for it has no intrinsic worth, and their maxim has no moral import.  They preserve their life as duty requires, no doubt, but not because duty requires.  On the other hand, if adversity and hopeless sorrow have completely taken away the relish for life; if the unfortunate one, strong in mind, indignant at his fate rather than desponding or dejected, wishes for death, and yet preserves his life without loving it—­not from inclination or fear, but from duty—­then his maxim has a moral worth.