body of persons.  The commissioners state, in their general report of 1835:—­’The most common and most striking defect in the constitution of the municipal corporations of England and Wales is, that the corporate bodies exist independently of the communities among which they are found.  The corporations look upon themselves, and are considered by the inhabitants, as separate and exclusive bodies; they have powers and privileges within towns and cities from which they are named, but in most places all identity of interest between the corporation and the inhabitants has disappeared.’  From the defect described in this passage, the Corporation of London has for many years been exempt.  The manner in which the Common Council is elected has produced, to a great extent, an identity of interests between the governing municipal body and the existing municipal community, and has secured to the latter a council representing their general opinions and feelings.  The Municipal Commissioners particularly advert to the Common Council of London, as distinguishing that corporation from the close corporations which then prevailed throughout the country.”

It is difficult to imagine a better reason for upholding the existing order of things than this very report of the commissioners.  They admit that there is an identity of interests between the governing and the governed, between the representatives and their constituents, between the stewards and those for whom they act.  No higher commendation can be desired.  The system is described as giving satisfaction to all concerned in its operation, and as being free from the great defect which vitiated the municipal arrangements of other cities.  The administrative power is not accumulated in the hands of a few, but is freely intrusted to an ample number of representatives chosen by popular election, and liable to removal at the expiration of a year.  The fact that the votes of the citizens are usually given to their representatives of many years’ standing, is an indisputable proof that the latter do not neglect their duty, or overlook the identity of interests that exists between the governing body and the municipal community.  And yet, in the teeth of this report, and in defiance of this good accord, the very defect is to be introduced which was reprobated in other corporations.  The administrative power is to be vested in the hands of a comparatively small governing body, and an opportunity afforded for those practices which were considered so objectionable elsewhere.

It is perhaps hardly worthy of remark that the selection of the persons to be appointed to set out the new wards should rest with the Secretary of State.  Were it not for the constant augmentation of patronage afforded by each innovation, very little would ever be heard about reform of any kind.  But every change, every act of abolition, affords am irresistible opportunity for providing for poor relations and importunate