Secondly, It is remarkable, that the miracles wrought by the apostles after the death of Christ, those especially which occasioned the calling of this council, had a much greater effect upon the Jews, than even the miracles of Christ himself. They held out against all the wonders of Christ, and were perpetually plotting his death, not doubting but that would put an end to all their trouble: but when, after his death, they saw the same powers continue with the apostles, they saw no end of the affair, but began to think in earnest there might be more in it than they were willing to believe. And, upon the report made to them of the apostle’s works, they make serious reflexion, and doubted whereunto this would grow. And though in their anger and vexation of heart they thought of desperate remedies, and were for killing the apostles also; yet they hearkened willing to Gamaliel’s advice; which at another time might have been dangerous to the adviser. So that it appears from the history, that the whole council had the same doubt that Gamaliel had, that possibly the hand of God might be in this thing. And could the Jews, if they had manifestly discovered the cheat of the resurrection a little time before, have entertained such a suspicion?
The last period commences at the resurrection, and takes in the evidence upon which the credit of this fact stands.
The council for Woolston, among other difficulties, started one, which, if well grounded, excludes all evidence out of this case. The resurrection being a thing out of the course of nature, he thinks the testimony of nature, held forth to us in her constant method of working, a stronger evidence against the possibility of a resurrection, than any human evidence can be for the reality of one.
In answer to this, it is said, on the other side,
First, That a resurrection is a thing to be judged of by mens senses; and this cannot be doubted. We all know when a man is dead; and should he come to life again, we might judge whether he was alive or no, by the very same means by which we judge those about us to be living men.
Secondly, That the notion of a resurrection, contradicts no one principle of right reason, interferes with no law of nature: and that whoever admits that God gave man life at first, cannot possibly doubt of his power to restore it when lost.
Thirdly, That appealing to the settled course of nature, is referring the matter in dispute, not to rules or maxims of reason and true philosophy, but to the prejudices and mistakes of men; which are various and infinite, and differ sometimes according to the climate men live in; because men form a notion of nature from what they see: and therefore in cold countries all men judge it to be according to the course of nature for water to freeze; in warm countries they judge it to be unnatural. Consequently, that it is not enough to prove anything to be contrary to the laws of nature, to say that it is usually, or constantly, to our observation, otherwise. And therefore, though men in the ordinary course die, and do not rise again, (which is certainly a prejudice against the belief of a resurrection); yet is it not an argument against the possibility of a resurrection?