decrees and separation orders, the attempt to use children as an obstacle to divorce is hardly worth arguing with.  We shall deal with the children just as we should deal with them if their homes were broken up by any other cause.  There is a sense in which children are a real obstacle to divorce:  they give parents a common interest which keeps together many a couple who, if childless, would separate.  The marriage law is superfluous in such cases.  This is shewn by the fact that the proportion of childless divorces is much larger than the proportion of divorces from all causes.  But it must not be forgotten that the interest of the children forms one of the most powerful arguments for divorce.  An unhappy household is a bad nursery.  There is something to be said for the polygynous or polyandrous household as a school for children:  children really do suffer from having too few parents:  this is why uncles and aunts and tutors and governesses are often so good for children.  But it is just the polygamous household which our marriage law allows to be broken up, and which, as we have seen, is not possible as a typical institution in a democratic country where the numbers of the sexes are about equal.  Therefore polygyny and polyandry as a means of educating children fall to the ground, and with them, I think, must go the opinion which has been expressed by Gladstone and others, that an extension of divorce, whilst admitting many new grounds for it, might exclude the ground of adultery.  There are, however, clearly many things that make some of our domestic interiors little private hells for children (especially when the children are quite content in them) which would justify any intelligent State in breaking up the home and giving the custody of the children either to the parent whose conscience had revolted against the corruption of the children, or to neither.

Which brings me to the point that divorce should no longer be confined to cases in which one of the parties petitions for it.  If, for instance, you have a thoroughly rascally couple making a living by infamous means and bringing up their children to their trade, the king’s proctor, instead of pursuing his present purely mischievous function of preventing couples from being divorced by proving that they both desire it, might very well intervene and divorce these children from their parents.  At present, if the Queen herself were to rescue some unfortunate child from degradation and misery and place her in a respectable home, and some unmentionable pair of blackguards claimed the child and proved that they were its father and mother, the child would be given to them in the name of the sanctity of the home and the holiness of parentage, after perpetrating which crime the law would calmly send an education officer to take the child out of the parents’ hands several hours a day in the still more sacred name of compulsory education. (Of course what would really happen would be that the couple would blackmail the Queen for their consent to the salvation of the child, unless, indeed, a hint from a police inspector convinced them that bad characters cannot always rely on pedantically constitutional treatment when they come into conflict with persons in high station).