that the insanity may be privileged, as Savonarola’s
was up to the point of wrecking the social life of
Florence, does not alter the case. We always hesitate
to treat a dangerously good man as a lunatic because
he may turn out to be a prophet in the true sense:
that is, a man of exceptional sanity who is in the
right when we are in the wrong. However necessary
it may have been to get rid of Savonarola, it was
foolish to poison Socrates and burn St. Joan of Arc.
But it is none the less necessary to take a firm stand
against the monstrous proposition that because certain
attitudes and sentiments may be heroic and admirable
at some momentous crisis, they should or can be maintained
at the same pitch continuously through life. A
life spent in prayer and alms giving is really as
insane as a life spent in cursing and picking pockets:
the effect of everybody doing it would be equally
disastrous. The superstitious tolerance so long
accorded to monks and nuns is inevitably giving way
to a very general and very natural practice of confiscating
their retreats and expelling them from their country,
with the result that they come to England and Ireland,
where they are partly unnoticed and partly encouraged
because they conduct technical schools and teach our
girls softer speech and gentler manners than our comparatively
ruffianly elementary teachers. But they are still
full of the notion that because it is possible for
men to attain the summit of Mont Blanc and stay there
for an hour, it is possible for them to live there.
Children are punished and scolded for not living there;
and adults take serious offence if it is not assumed
that they live there.
As a matter of fact, ethical strain is just as bad
for us as physical strain. It is desirable that
the normal pitch of conduct at which men are not conscious
of being particularly virtuous, although they feel
mean when they fall below it, should be raised as
high as possible; but it is not desirable that they
should attempt to live above this pitch any more than
that they should habitually walk at the rate of five
miles an hour or carry a hundredweight continually
on their backs. Their normal condition should
be in nowise difficult or remarkable; and it is a
perfectly sound instinct that leads us to mistrust
the good man as much as the bad man, and to object
to the clergyman who is pious extra-professionally
as much as to the professional pugilist who is quarrelsome
and violent in private life. We do not want good
men and bad men any more than we want giants and dwarfs.
What we do want is a high quality for our normal:
that is, people who can be much better than what we
now call respectable without self-sacrifice.
Conscious goodness, like conscious muscular effort,
may be of use in emergencies; but for everyday national
use it is negligible; and its effect on the character
of the individual may easily be disastrous.
FOR BETTER FOR WORSE