relapsing into the old current way of thinking.  Do you expect that the honest, stupid person will judge thus?  If so, you are mistaken.  He is not shaken in the least by all these strong reasons.  The man who has set these reasons forth is known to be a master of logic:  that is good ground why all his reasons should count for nothing.  Oh, says the stupid, honest person, we all know that the Archbishop can prove anything!  And so the whole thing is finally settled.

I have a considerable list of instances in which the reaction from an error on one side of the line of right, lands in error equally distant from the line of right on the other side:  but it is needless to go on to illustrate these at length; the mere mention of them will suffice to suggest many thoughts to the intelligent reader.  A primary vulgar error, to which very powerful minds have frequently shown a strong tendency, is bigoted intolerance:  intolerance in politics, in religion, in ecclesiastical affairs, in morals, in anything.  You may safely say that nothing but most unreasonable bigotry would lead a Tory to say that all Whigs are scoundrels, or a Whig to Bay that all Tories are bloated tyrants or crawling sycophants.  I must confess that, in severe reason, it is impossible entirely to justify the Churchman who holds that all Dissenters are extremely bad; though (so does inveterate prepossession warp the intellect) I have also to admit that it appears to me that for a Dissenter to hold that there is little or no good in the Church is a great deal worse.  There is something fine, however, about a heartily intolerant man:  you like him, though you disapprove of him.  Even if I were inclined to Whiggery, I should admire the downright dictum of Dr. Johnson, that the devil was the first Whig.  Even if I were a Nonconformist, I should like Sydney Smith the better for the singular proof of his declining strength which he once adduced:  ‘I do believe,’ he said, ’that if you were to put a knife into my hand, I should not have vigour enough to stick it into a Dissenter!’ The secondary error in this respect is a latitudinarian liberality which regards truth and falsehood as matters of indifference.  Genuine liberality of sentiment is a good thing, and difficult as it is good:  but much liberality, political and religious, arises really from the fact, that the liberal man does not care a rush about the matter in debate.  It is very easy to be tolerant in a case in which you have no feeling whatever either way.  The Churchman who does not mind a bit whether the Church stands or falls, has no difficulty in tolerating the enemies and assailants of the Church.  It is different with a man who holds the existence of a national Establishment as a vital matter.  And I have generally remarked that when clergymen of the Church profess extreme catholicity of spirit, and declare that they do not regard it as a thing of the least consequence whether a man be Churchman or Dissenter, intelligent Nonconformists receive such protestations with much contempt, and (possibly with injustice) suspect their utterer of hypocrisy.  If you really care much about any principle; and if you regard it as of essential importance; you cannot help feeling a strong impulse to intolerance of those who decidedly and actively differ from you.