Thus does the author lay down the simple, general principle from which he is speedily to draw conclusions so startling.  Nothing can be more innocuous than all this.  Every one must agree in it.  Now come the further steps.

The study of nature leads to the conclusion that there is a defectiveness in man which modifies his perception of all external things; and that thus in so far as the actual fact of the universe differs from our impression of it, the actual fact is better, higher, more complete, than our impression of it.  There are qualities, there is a glory about the universe, which our defective condition prevents our seeing or discerning.  The universe, or nature, is not in itself such as it is to man’s feeling; and man’s feeling of it differs from the fact liy defect.  All that we discern in the universe is there:  and a great deal besides.

Now, we think of nature as existing in a certain way which we call physical.  We call the world the physical world.  This mode of existence involves inertness.  That which is physical does not act, except passively, as it is acted upon.  Inertness is inaction.  That which is inert, therefore, differs from that which is not inert by defect.  The inert wants something of being active.

Next, we have a conception of another mode of being besides the inert.  We conceive of being which possesses a spontaneous and primary activity.  This kind of being is called spiritual.  This kind of being has shaken off the reproach of inertness.  It can act, and originate action.  The physical thus differs from the spiritual (as regards inertness) by defect.  The physical wants something of being spiritual.

So far, my reader, we do not of necessity start back from anything our author teaches us.  Quite true, we think of matter, a kind of being which can do nothing of itself.  Quite true, we think of spirit, a kind of being which can do.  And no doubt that which is able to do is (quoad hoc) a higher and more noble kind of being than that which cannot do, but only be done to.  But remember here, I do not admit that in this point lies the differentia between matter and spirit.  I do not grant that by taking from matter the reproach of inertness, you would make it spirit.  The essential difference seems to me not to lie there.  We could conceive of matter as capable of originating action, and yet as material.  This is by the bye—­but now be on your guard.  Here is our author’s great discovery—­

It is man’s defectiveness which makes him feel the world as thus defective.  Nature is really not inert, though it appears so to man.  We have been wont to think that nature, the universe, is inert or physical; that man is not-inert, or spiritual.  Now, there is no doubt at all that there is inertness somewhere.  Here are the two things, Man and Nature; with which thing does the inertness lie?  Our author maintains that it lies with man, not with nature.  Science has proved to us that nature is not-inert.