regards the whole system of Nature as one which had
received at its first formation the impress of the
will of its Author, foreseeing the varied yet necessary
laws of its action throughout the whole of its existence,
ordaining when and bow each particular of the stupendous
plan should be realized in effect, and—with
Him to whom to will is to do—in ordaining
doing it, Whether profoundly philosophical or not,
a view maintained by eminent philosophical physicists
and theologians, such as Babbage on the one hand and
Jowett on the other, will hardly be denounced as atheism.
Perhaps Mr. Darwin would prefer to express his idea
in a more general way, by adopting the thoughtful
words of one of the most eminent naturalists of this
or any age, substituting the word action for “thought,”
since it is the former (from which alone the latter
can be inferred) that he has been considering.
“Taking Nature as exhibiting thought for my guide,
it appears to me that while human thought is consecutive,
Divine thought is simultaneous, embracing at the same
time and forever, in the past, the present and the
future, the most diversified relations among hundreds
of thousands of organized beings, each of which may
present complications again, which to study and understand
even imperfectly—as for instance man himself—
mankind has already spent thousands of years."[I-14]
In thus conceiving of the Divine Power in act as coetaneous
with Divine Thought, and of both as far as may be
apart from the human element of time, our author may
regard the intervention of the Creator either as, humanly
speaking, done from all time, or else as doing through
all time. In the ultimate analysis we suppose
that every philosophical theist must adopt one or
the other conception.
A perversion of the first view leads toward atheism,
the notion of an eternal sequence of cause and effect,
for which there is no first cause—a view
which few sane persons can long rest in. The danger
which may threaten the second view is pantheism.
We feel safe from either error, in our profound conviction
that there is order in the universe; that order presupposes
mind; design, will; and mind or will, personality.
Thus guarded, we much prefer the second of the two
conceptions of causation, as the more philosophical
as well as Christian view—a view which leaves
us with the same difficulties and the same mysteries
in Nature as in Providence, and no other. Natural
law, upon this view, is the human conception of continued
and orderly Divine action.
We do not suppose that less power, or other power,
is required to sustain the universe and carry on its
operations, than to bring it into being. So,
while conceiving no improbability of “interventions
of Creative mind in Nature,” if by such is meant
the bringing to pass of new and fitting events at
fitting times, we leave it for profounder minds to
establish, if they can, a rational distinction in
kind between his working in Nature carrying on operations,
and in initiating those operations.