And why not suppose that the finder of the watch, or of the watch-wheel, infers both design and human workmanship?  The two are mutually exclusive only on the supposition that man alone is a designer, which is simply begging the question in discussion.  If the watch-finder’s attention had been arrested by a different object, such as a spider’s web, he would have inferred both design and non-human workmanship.  Of some objects he might be uncertain whether they were of human origin or not, with-out ever doubting they were designed, while of others this might remain doubtful.  Nor is man’s recognition of human workmanship, or of any other, dependent upon his comprehending how it was done, or what particular ends it subserves.  Such considerations make it clear that “the label of human workmanship” is not the generic stamp from which man infers design.  It seems equally clear that “the mental operation required in the one case” is not so radically or materially “different from that performed in the other” as this writer would have us suppose.  The judgment respecting a spider’s web, or a trap-door spider’s dwelling, would be the very same in this regard if it preceded, as it occasionally might, all knowledge of whether the object met with were of human or animal origin.  A dam across a stream, and the appearance of the stumps of trees which entered into its formation, would suggest design quite irrespective of and antecedent to the considerable knowledge or experience which would enable the beholder to decide whether this was the work of men or of beavers.  Why, then, should the judgment that any particular structure is a designed work be thought illegitimate when attributed to a higher instead of a lower intelligence than that of man?  It might, indeed, be so if the supposed observer had no conception of a power and intelligence superior to his own.  But it would then be more than “irrelevant;” it would be impossible, except on the supposition that the phenomena would of themselves give rise to such an inference.  That it is now possible to make the inference, and, indeed, hardly possible not to make it, is sufficient warrant of its relevancy.

It may, of course, be rejoined that, if this important factor is given, the inference yields no independent argument of a divine creator; and it may also be reasonably urged that the difference between things that are made under our observation and comprehension, and things that grow, but have originated beyond our comprehension, is too wide for a sure inference from the one to the other.  But the present question involves neither of these.  It is simply whether the argument for design from adaptations in Nature is relevant, not whether it is independent or sure.  It is conceded that the argument is analogical, and the parallel incomplete.  But the gist is in the points that are parallel or similar.  Pulleys, valves, and suchlike elaborate mechanical adaptations, cannot differ greatly in meaning, wherever met with.