has been received by library patrons and before it has been subject to a judicial determination that it is unprotected under the First Amendment.  See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v.  Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975).  Finally, plaintiffs submit that CIPA is unconstitutionally vague.  See City of Chicago v.  Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999). 
       CIPA defines “[m]inor” as “any individual who has not
attained the age of 17 years.”  CIPA Sec. 1721(c) (codified at 47 U.S.C.  Sec. 254(h)(7)(D)).  CIPA further provides that “[o]bscene” has the meaning given in 18 U.S.C.  Sec. 1460, and “child pornography” has the meaning given in 18 U.S.C.  Sec. 2256.  CIPA Sec. 1721(c) (codified at 47 U.S.C.  Sec. 254(h)(7)(E) & (F)).  CIPA defines material that is “harmful to minors” as: 

any picture, image, graphic image file, or other visual depiction that – (i) taken as a whole and with respect to minors, appeals to a prurient interest in nudity, sex, or excretion; (ii) depicts, describes, or represents, in a patently offensive way with respect to what is suitable for minors, an actual or simulated sexual act or sexual contact, actual or simulated normal or perverted sexual acts, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals; and (iii) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value as to minors.  CIPA Sec. 1721(c) (codified at 47 U.S.C.  Sec. 254(h)(7)(G)).  CIPA prohibits federal interference in local determinations regarding what Internet content is appropriate for minors: 

A determination regarding what matter is appropriate for minors shall be made by the school board, local educational agency, library or other authority responsible for making the determination.  No agency or instrumentality of the United States Government may – (A) establish criteria for making such determination; (B) review the determination made by the certifying [entity] . . . ; or (C) consider the criteria employed by the certifying [entity] . . . in the administration of subsection (h)(1)(B).

CIPA Sec. 1732 (codified at 47 U.S.C.  Sec. 254(l)(2)). 
        The government challenges the standing of several of the
plaintiffs and the ripeness of their claims.  These include all of the Web site publishers and all of the individual library patrons.  Notwithstanding these objections, we are confident that the “case or controversy” requirement of Article iii, Sec. 2 of the Constitution is met by the existence of the plaintiff libraries that qualify for LSTA and E-rate funding and the library associations whose members qualify for such funding.  These plaintiffs are faced with the impending choice of either certifying compliance with CIPA by July 1, 2002, or foregoing subsidies under the LSTA and E-rate programs, and therefore clearly have standing to challenge the constitutionality of the conditions to which they will be subject should they accept the subsidies.  We also note that the presence of the Web site publishers and individual