companies that sell access to sexually explicit recorded phone messages “testified that it is usually ‘impulse callers’ who utilize these types of services, and that people will not call if they must apply for an access code").  In sum, in many cases, as we have noted above, library patrons who have been wrongly denied access to a Web site will decline to ask the library to disable the filters so that the patron can access the Web site.  Moreover, even if patrons requested unblocking every time a site is erroneously blocked, and even if library staff granted every such request, a public library’s use of blocking software would still impermissibly burden patrons’ access to speech based on its content.  The First Amendment jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit makes clear that laws imposing content-based burdens on access to speech are no less offensive to the First Amendment than laws imposing content-based prohibitions on speech:  It is of no moment that the statute does not impose a complete prohibition.  The distinction between laws burdening and laws banning speech is but a matter of degree.  The Government’s content-based burdens must satisfy the same rigorous scrutiny as its content-based bans. . . .  When the purpose and design of a statute is to regulate speech by reason of its content, special consideration or latitude is not afforded to the Government merely because the law can somehow be described as a burden rather than outright suppression.

United States v.  Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 812, 826 (2000) (invalidating a federal law requiring cable television operators to limit the transmission of sexually explicit programming to the hours between 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m.); see also Fabulous Assocs., 896 F.2d at 785 ("[H]ere . . . there is no outright prohibition of indecent communication.  However, the First Amendment protects against government inhibition as well as prohibition.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Even if CIPA’s disabling provisions could be perfectly implemented by library staff every time patrons request access to an erroneously blocked Web site, we hold that the content-based burden that the library’s use of software filters places on patrons’ access to speech suffers from the same constitutional deficiencies as a complete ban on patrons’ access to speech that was erroneously blocked by filters, since patrons will often be deterred from asking the library to unblock a site and patron requests cannot be immediately reviewed.  We therefore hold that CIPA’s disabling provisions fail to cure CIPA’s lack of narrow tailoring. 5.  Conclusion; Severability