To determine whether the disabling provisions cure CIPA’s lack of narrow tailoring, we must first determine, as a matter of statutory construction, under what circumstances the disabling provisions permit libraries to disable the software filters.  It is unclear to us whether CIPA’s disabling provisions permit libraries to disable the filters any time a patron wishes to access speech that is neither obscenity, child pornography, or in the case of a minor patron, material that is harmful to minors.  Whether CIPA permits disabling in such instances depends on the meaning of the provisions’ reference to “bona fide research or other lawful purpose.”  On the one hand, the language “to enable access for bona fide research or other lawful purpose” could be interpreted to mean “to enable access to all constitutionally protected material.”  As a textual matter, this reading of the disabling provisions is plausible.  If a patron seeks access to speech that is constitutionally protected, then it is reasonable to conclude that the patron has a “lawful purpose,” since the dissemination and receipt of constitutionally protected speech cannot be made unlawful.

Moreover, since a narrower construction of the disabling provision creates more constitutional problems than a construction of the disabling provisions that permits access to all constitutionally protected speech, the broader interpretation is preferable. “[I]f an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, and where an alternative interpretation of the statute is fairly possible, we are obligated to construe the statute to avoid such problems.”  Ins v.  St. Cyr, 121 S. Ct. 2271, 2279 (2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  On the other hand, interpreting CIPA’s disabling provisions to permit disabling for access to all constitutionally protected speech presents several problems.  First, if “other lawful purpose” means “for the purpose of accessing constitutionally protected speech,” then this reading renders superfluous CIPA’s reference to “bona fide research,” which clearly contemplates some purpose beyond simply accessing constitutionally protected speech.  In general, “courts should disfavor interpretations of statutes that render language superfluous.”  Conn.  Nat’l Bank v.  Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992).  Furthermore, Congress is clearly capable of explicitly specifying categories of constitutionally unprotected speech, as it did when it drafted CIPA to require funding recipients to use technology protection measures that protect against visual depictions that are “obscene,” “child pornography,” or, in the case of minors, “harmful to minors.”  CIPA Sec. 1712(a) (codified at 20 U.S.C.  Sec. 9134(f)(1)(A)(i)(I)-(iii)); CIPA Sec. 1721(b) (codified at 47 U.S.C.  Sec. 254(h)(6)(B)(i)(I)-(iii)).  If Congress intended CIPA’s disabling provisions simply to permit libraries to disable the filters