Amendment articulates a deep fear of government intervention in the marketplace of ideas (because of the risk of distortion), it also seems prepared to permit state-sponsored and -supported cultural institutions that exercise considerable control over which art to fund, which pictures to hang, and which courses to teach.  That these choices necessarily involve judgments about favored and disfavored content – judgments clearly prohibited in the realm of censorship – is indisputable.

Lee C. Bollinger, Public Institutions of Culture and the First Amendment:  The New Frontier, 63 U. Cin.  L. Rev. 1103, 1110-15 (1995). 
       In both of these cases, the taxation scheme at issue
effectively subsidized a vast range of publications, and singled out for penalty only a handful of speakers.  See Arkansas Writers’ Project, 460 U.S. at 228-29 (noting that “selective taxation of the press – . . . [by] targeting individual members of the press – poses a particular danger of abuse by the State” and explaining that “this case involves a more disturbing use of selective taxation than Minneapolis Star, because the basis on which Arkansas differentiates between magazines is particularly repugnant to First Amendment principles:  a magazine’s tax status depends entirely on its content"); Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 591 ("Minnesota’s ink and paper tax violates the First Amendment not only because it singles out the press, but also because it targets a small group of newspapers."); see also Turner Broad.  Sys., Inc. v.  FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 660 (1994) ("The taxes invalidated in Minneapolis Star and Arkansas Writers’ Project . . . targeted a small number of speakers, and thus threatened to distort the market for ideas.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
         [P]atrons at a library do not have the right to
make editorial decisions regarding the availability of certain material.  It is the exclusive authority of the library to make affirmative decisions regarding what books, magazines, or other material is placed on library shelves, or otherwise made available to patrons.  Libraries impose many restrictions on the use of their systems which demonstrate that the content of the library’s offerings are not determined by the general public.

S. Rep.  No. 106-141, at 8-9 (1999). 
       In distinguishing restrictions on public libraries’ print
collections from restrictions on the provision of Internet access, we do not rely on the rationale adopted in Mainstream Loudoun v.  Board of Trustees of the Loudoun County Library, 2 F. Supp. 2d 783 (E.D.  Va. 1998).  The Loudoun Court reasoned that a library’s decision to block certain Web sites fundamentally differs from its decision to carry certain books but not others, in that unlike the money and shelf space consumed by the library’s provision of print materials, “no appreciable expenditure of library time or resources is required to make a particular Internet publication available” once