Letters to Sir William Windham and Mr. Pope eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 175 pages of information about Letters to Sir William Windham and Mr. Pope.

Letters to Sir William Windham and Mr. Pope eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 175 pages of information about Letters to Sir William Windham and Mr. Pope.

I desire you not to imagine neither that I understand by the first philosophy even such a science as my Lord Bacon describes—­a science of general observations and axioms, such as do not belong properly to any particular part of science, but are common to many, “and of an higher stage,” as he expresses himself.  He complains that philosophers have not gone up to the “spring-head,” which would be of “general and excellent use for the disclosing of Nature and the abridgment of art,” though they “draw now and then a bucket of water out of the well for some particular use.”  I respect—­no man more—­ this great authority; but I respect no authority enough to subscribe on the faith of it, to that which appears to me fantastical, as if it were real.  Now this spring-head of science is purely fantastical, and the figure conveys a false notion to the mind, as figures employed licentiously are apt to do.  The great author himself calls these axioms, which are to constitute his first philosophy, observations.  Such they are properly; for there are some uniform principles, or uniform impressions of the same nature, to be observed in very different subjects, “una eademque naturae vestigia aut signacula diversis materiis et subjectis impressa.”  These observations, therefore, when they are sufficiently verified and well established, may be properly applied in discourse, or writing, from one subject to another.  But I apprehend that when they are so applied, they serve rather to illustrate a proposition than to disclose Nature, or to abridge art.  They may have a better foundation than similitudes and comparisons more loosely and more superficially made.  They may compare realities, not appearances; things that Nature has made alike, not things that seem only to have some relation of this kind in our imaginations.  But still they are comparisons of things distinct and independent.  They do not lead us to things, but things that are lead us to make them.  He who possesses two sciences, and the same will be often true of arts, may find in certain respects a similitude between them because he possesses both.  If he did not possess both, be would be led by neither to the acquisition of the other.  Such observations are effects, not means of knowledge; and, therefore, to suppose that any collection of them can constitute a science of an “higher stage,” from whence we may reason a priori down to particulars, is, I presume, to suppose something very groundless, and very useless at best, to the advancement of knowledge.  A pretended science of this kind must be barren of knowledge, and may be fruitful of error, as the Persian magic was, if it proceeded on the faint analogy that may be discovered between physics and politics, and deduced the rules of civil government from what the professors of it observed of the operations and works of Nature in the material world.  The very specimen of their magic which my Lord Bacon has given would be sufficient to justify what is here objected to his doctrine.

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Letters to Sir William Windham and Mr. Pope from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.