experience from which neither pragmatists nor anti-pragmatists escape.  They form an inevitable regulative postulate in every one’s thinking.  Our notion of them is the most abundantly suggested and satisfied of all our beliefs, the last to suffer doubt.  The difference is that our critics use this belief as their sole paradigm, and treat any one who talks of human realities as if he thought the notion of reality ‘in itself’ illegitimate.  Meanwhile, reality-in-itself, so far as by them talked of, is only a human object; they postulate it just as we postulate it; and if we are subjectivists they are so no less.  Realities in themselves can be there for any one, whether pragmatist or anti-pragmatist, only by being believed; they are believed only by their notions appearing true; and their notions appear true only because they work satisfactorily.  Satisfactorily, moreover, for the particular thinker’s purpose.  There is no idea which is the true idea, of anything.  Whose is the true idea of the absolute?  Or to take M. Hebert’s example, what is the true idea of a picture which you possess?  It is the idea that most satisfactorily meets your present interest.  The interest may be in the picture’s place, its age, its ‘tone,’ its subject, its dimensions, its authorship, its price, its merit, or what not.  If its authorship by Corot have been doubted, what will satisfy the interest aroused in you at that moment will be to have your claim to own a Corot confirmed; but, if you have a normal human mind, merely calling it a Corot will not satisfy other demands of your mind at the same time.  For them to be satisfied, what you learn of the picture must make smooth connection with what you know of the rest of the system of reality in which the actual Corot played his part.  M. Hebert accuses us of holding that the proprietary satisfactions of themselves suffice to make the belief true, and that, so far as we are concerned, no actual Corot need ever have existed.  Why we should be thus cut off from the more general and intellectual satisfactions, I know not; but whatever the satisfactions may be, intellectual or proprietary, they belong to the subjective side of the truth-relation.  They found our beliefs; our beliefs are in realities; if no realities are there, the beliefs are false but if realities are there, how they can even be known without first being believed; or how believed except by our first having ideas of them that work satisfactorily, pragmatists find it impossible to imagine.  They also find it impossible to imagine what makes the anti-pragmatists’ dogmatic ‘ipse dixit’ assurance of reality more credible than the pragmatists conviction based on concrete verifications.  M. Hebert will probably agree to this, when put in this way, so I do not see our inferiority to him in the matter of connaissance proprement dite.