And thus do men invariably decide such a question.  The falling of the DREAM’S practical consequences into the real world, and the extent of the resemblance between the two worlds are the criteria they instinctively use. [Footnote:  The thoroughgoing objector might, it is true, still return to the charge, and, granting a dream which should completely mirror the real universe, and all the actions dreamed in which should be instantly matched by duplicate actions in this universe, still insist that this is nothing more than harmony, and that it is as far as ever from being made clear whether the dream-world refers to that other world, all of whose details it so closely copies.  This objection leads deep into metaphysics.  I do not impugn its importance, and justice obliges me to say that but for the teachings of my colleague, Dr. Josiah Royce, I should neither have grasped its full force nor made my own practical and psychological point of view as clear to myself as it is.  On this occasion I prefer to stick steadfastly to that point of view; but I hope that Dr. Royce’s more fundamental criticism of the function of cognition may ere long see the light. [I referred in this note to Royce’s religious aspect of philosophy, then about to be published.  This powerful book maintained that the notion of referring involved that of an inclusive mind that shall own both the real q and the mental q, and use the latter expressly as a representative symbol of the former.  At the time I could not refute this transcendentalist opinion.  Later, largely through the influence of Professor D. S. Miller (see his essay ‘The meaning of truth and error,’ in the Philosophical Review for 1893, vol. 2 p. 403) I came to see that any definitely experienceable workings would serve as intermediaries quite as well as the absolute mind’s intentions would.]] All feeling is for the sake of action, all feeling results in action,—­to-day no argument is needed to prove these truths.  But by a most singular disposition of nature which we may conceive to have been different, my feelings act upon the realities within my critic’s world.  Unless, then, my critic can prove that my feeling does not ‘point to’ those realities which it acts upon, how can he continue to doubt that he and I are alike cognizant of one and the same real world?  If the action is performed in one world, that must be the world the feeling intends; if in another world, that is the world the feeling has in mind.  If your feeling bear no fruits in my world, I call it utterly detached from my world; I call it a solipsism, and call its world a dream-world.  If your toothache do not prompt you to act as if I had a toothache, nor even as if I had a separate existence; if you neither say to me, ‘I know now how you must suffer!’ nor tell me of a remedy, I deny that your feeling, however it may resemble mine, is really cognizant of mine.  It gives no sign of being cognizant, and such a sign is absolutely necessary to my admission that it is.