For the pragmatist, on the contrary,—­all discarnate truth is static, impotent, and relatively spectral, full truth being the truth that energizes and does battle.  Can any one suppose that the sleeping quality of truth would ever have been abstracted or have received a name, if truths had remained forever in that storage- vault of essential timeless ‘agreements’ and had never been embodied in any panting struggle of men’s live ideas for verification?  Surely no more than the abstract property of ‘fitting’ would have received a name, if in our world there had been no backs or feet or gaps in walls to be actually fitted.  Existential truth is incidental to the actual competition of opinions.  Essential truth, the truth of the intellectualists, the truth with no one thinking it, is like the coat that fits tho no one has ever tried it on, like the music that no ear has listened to.  It is less real, not more real, than the verified article; and to attribute a superior degree of glory to it seems little more than a piece of perverse abstraction-worship.  As well might a pencil insist that the outline is the essential thing in all pictorial representation, and chide the paint-brush and the camera for omitting it, forgetting that their pictures not only contain the whole outline, but a hundred other things in addition.  Pragmatist truth contains the whole of intellectualist truth and a hundred other things in addition.  Intellectualist truth is then only pragmatist truth in posse.  That on innumerable occasions men do substitute truth in posse or verifiability, for verification or truth in act, is a fact to which no one attributes more importance than the pragmatist:  he emphasizes the practical utility of such a habit.  But he does not on that account consider truth in posse,—­truth not alive enough ever to have been asserted or questioned or contradicted, to be the metaphysically prior thing, to which truths in act are tributary and subsidiary.  When intellectualists do this, pragmatism charges them with inverting the real relation.  Truth in posse means only truths in act; and he insists that these latter take precedence in the order of logic as well as in that of being.

Seventh MINUNDERSTANDING:  Pragmatism ignores the theoretical interest.

This would seem to be an absolutely wanton slander, were not a certain excuse to be found in the linguistic affinities of the word ‘pragmatism,’ and in certain offhand habits of speech of ours which assumed too great a generosity on our reader’s part.  When we spoke of the meaning of ideas consisting “in their ‘practical’ consequences”, or of the ‘practical’ differences which our beliefs make to us; when we said that the truth of a belief consists in its ‘working’ value, etc.; our language evidently was too careless, for by ‘practical’ we were almost unanimously held to mean opposed to theoretical or genuinely