Now, our supposed little feeling gives a what; and if other feelings should succeed which remember the first, its what may stand as subject or predicate of some piece of knowledge-about, of some judgment, perceiving relations between it and other whats which the other feelings may know.  The hitherto dumb Q will then receive a name and be no longer speechless.  But every name, as students of logic know, has its ‘denotation’; and the denotation always means some reality or content, relationless as extra or with its internal relations unanalyzed, like the Q which our primitive sensation is supposed to know.  No relation-expressing proposition is possible except on the basis of a preliminary acquaintance with such ‘facts,’ with such contents, as this.  Let the Q be fragrance, let it be toothache, or let it be a more complex kind of feeling, like that of the full-moon swimming in her blue abyss, it must first come in that simple shape, and be held fast in that first intention, before any knowledge about it can be attained.  The knowledge about it is it with a context added.  Undo it, and what is added cannot be CONtext. [Footnote:  If A enters and B exclaims, ‘Didn’t you see my brother on the stairs?’ we all hold that A may answer, ‘I saw him, but didn’t know he was your brother’; ignorance of brotherhood not abolishing power to see.  But those who, on account of the unrelatedness of the first facts with which we become acquainted, deny them to be ‘known’ to us, ought in consistency to maintain that if A did not perceive the relationship of the man on the stairs to B, it was impossible he should have noticed him at all.]

Let us say no more then about this objection, but enlarge our thesis, thus:  If there be in the universe a Q other than the Q in the feeling, the latter may have acquaintance with an entity ejective to itself; an acquaintance moreover, which, as mere acquaintance, it would be hard to imagine susceptible either of improvement or increase, being in its way complete; and which would oblige us (so long as we refuse not to call acquaintance knowledge) to say not only that the feeling is cognitive, but that all qualities of feeling, so long as there is anything outside of them which they resemble, are feelings of qualities of existence, and perceptions of outward fact.

The point of this vindication of the cognitive function of the first feeling lies, it will be noticed, in the discovery that q does exist elsewhere than in it.  In case this discovery were not made, we could not be sure the feeling was cognitive; and in case there were nothing outside to be discovered, we should have to call the feeling a dream.  But the feeling itself cannot make the discovery.  Its own q is the only q it grasps; and its own nature is not a particle altered by having the self-transcendent function of